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KURZFASSUNG 
Kryptografische Methoden zielen der Sicherung von Information gegen 
unerwünschte Nutzung, wobei Codierungstechnik behandelt die Korrektur der 
Fehler in den Daten und deren zuverlässigen Rückgewinnung. Beide Techniken 
bedienen sich ähnlich Instrumente und besitzen ähnliche grenzen und Grenzwerte. 
In diese Dissertation, werden mehrere neue Verfahren zur Verbesserung der 
Systemzuverlässigkeit durch verschiedene Konstellationen zur Kombination der 
beiden Fehlerkontrollcodierung und Kryptografische Verfahren. In der ersten 
Konstellation werden reine kryptologische Funktionen verwendet, die zur 
Verbesserung der Zuverlässigkeitsaspekte in den Systemen die keine 
Zuverlässigkeitsfördernde Codierungs-Maßnahme enthalten dienen. Solche 
Systeme besitzen z. B. nur Authentifikation, Geheimhaltung oder Integritäts- 
Mechanismen in den Sicherheitsdiensten. Die zweite Konstellation verwendet eine 
Kombination von Fehlerkorrigierende Codes und Krypto-Mechanismen für die 
Verbesserung der Zuverlässigkeit des Systems. 
Der erste Beitrag  in diese Arbeit präsentiert ein neues praktisches Verfahren zur 
Erkennung und Korrektur von Verarbeitungsfehler in AES Chiffre. Die Ursachen 
solche Fehler konnten natürlich oder als Resultat eines beabsichtigten „Fault 
Injection“ Angriff  sein.  Das Verfahren nutzt die linearen Abbildungen im AES 
Runden-Funktion für Fehlerkontrolle.  
Der zweite Beitrag untersucht die Möglichkeit und Fähigkeit zur Einsatz von 
Hashfunktionen zur Erkennung und Korrektur vom Fehler. Die Fehlerkorrektur ist 
erreicht durch die Nutzung eines Anteil des Hash Bits  um eine Klasse von 
ausgewähltem Unidirektionalen-Fehler mit höhe Wahrscheinlichkeit zu korrigieren. 
Dabei wird der Fehlerkorrekturprozess die Authentifikationsgrad des Hashfunktion 
nicht signifikant reduzieren. 
In den dritten und vierten Beitrag werden Algorithmen vorgeschlagen um die 
Zuverlässigkeit des System über die klassischen grenzen verbessert. Das wird durch 
Kombination von Kryptologischen und Codierung Funktionen erreicht. Die neuen 
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Algorithmen sind auf die fundamentale Untersuchungen des zweiten Beitrag als 
Mechanismen für Fehlererkennung und Fehlerkorrektur basiert. Die neuen 
Algorithmen sind auf deren Kollision und Angriffskomplexität Verhalten untersucht 
worden, da Fehlerkorrektur durch Hashwert-Anpassung eines erfolgreichen 
Authentifikationsangriff ähnlich ist. Die resultierenden Verhalten zeigen gute Werte 
für erreichbare Fehlerkorrekturfähigkeit, Authentifikations-Grad und Integrität. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
5 
 
ABSTRACT 
Cryptographic techniques deal with securing information against unwanted 
usage, while coding techniques deals with keeping data error-free and retrieving 
them reliably. However, both techniques share many tools, bounds and limitations.  
In this thesis, several novel approaches towards improving system reliability by 
combining cryptographic and coding techniques in several constellations are 
presented. The first constellation is deploying pure cryptographic functions to 
improve reliability issues overshadowed in systems that previously had no 
reliability-supporting coding mechanisms. Such systems could have just 
authenticity, secrecy and/or integrity mechanisms for security services. The second 
constellation deploys a mixture of both cryptographic functions and error correction 
codes to improve the overall system reliability.   
The first contribution in this thesis, presents a new practical approach for 
detection and correction of execution errors for AES cipher. The source of such 
errors could be natural or as a result of fault injection attacks. The proposed 
approach is making use of the two linear mappings in the AES round structure for 
error control.  
The second contribution is investigating the possibility and ability of deploying 
pure cryptographic hash functions to detect and correct a class of errors. The error 
correction is achieved by deploying a part of the hash bits to correct a class of 
selected unidirectional error class with high probability.  The error correction 
process would degrade the authentication level in a non-significant fashion.  
In the third and fourth contributions, we propose algorithms to improve system 
correctability beyond classical limits by combining coding and cryptographic 
functions. The new algorithms are based mainly on the fundamentals investigated in 
the second contribution as mechanisms to detect and correct errors. The new 
algorithms are investigated in terms of collision and attacking complexity, as error 
correction via hash matching is similar to a successful authentication attack. The 
resulting performance showed achievable good error correctability, authenticity, 
and integrity figures. 
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INTRODUCTION                                                                  
The last decade has witnessed the emergence of numerous incredible 
cryptographic and channel coding applications, such as hashes, ciphers, and forward 
error correction codes. The growth of these disciplines over the last half century is 
part of a fascinating and important theories known as cryptography and coding 
theory. This basic theory of modern cryptography and channel coding improves the 
overall dependability and security of information in many different applications. 
However, despite this growth, dependability and security are still under extensive 
research and investigation. One important part of this research focuses on the 
aspects: authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, in addition to reliability. 
Note that the taxonomy of this thesis is adopting those published in [94] which 
examine the precise definitions characterizing various concepts that come into 
consideration when addressing the dependability and security in computing and 
communication systems. 
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 New reliability and security failures are currently being reported and detected 
within modern systems, such as in memories, commercial satellites, smart cards, 
etc. These failures have emerged as a natural result of shrinking, scaling down 
dimensions of the device structure, high density and/or high-performance, and other 
factors which have often led to a failure in the system. 
In fact, each failure has different types of error or fault handling, for instance, the 
security failures are solved by using security countermeasures to mitigate the threats 
associated with the data contents, while the reliability failures are solved by using 
proactive forward error correction codes (FEC).   
However, in spite of these capabilities, the reliability and security problems are 
still present due to limitation of the error correction capabilities, as well as the lack 
of reliability techniques inside many low-cost security systems. 
The limitation of error correction capabilities is attributed to the minimum 
distance boundary; specifically, as the minimum distance increases, the error 
correction capability increases also, but at the expense of more decoding 
complexity. Note that the error correction capability can approach a limited level 
and after that it is impossible to extend. On other hand, the lack of reliability 
mechanisms in some of the security systems negatively impacts the overall system 
behavior, even if the information provided is intact and error-free. As a result, these 
critical challenges in the new applications need to be addressed and encountered 
since each attribute of the reliability and security has a different level of accuracy 
and influence on the complete target applications contained therein.     
The solution is to deal with the overall system integrity, which satisfies system 
requirements in terms of security and reliability attributes, and serves to meet these 
challenges. Integrity is one of many important aspects related to 
reliability/availability and security services. A trade-off between the two attributes 
is therefore necessary.  Integrity, in terms of reliability, means the ability to restore 
information even if the data was destroyed during transmission or storing it in such 
a way that it stays intact and error-free, while data integrity in terms of security 
aspects means that the information received or stored has been secured and 
protected against attacking manipulations with a high degree of confidence.  
To summarize, Integrity is an important aspect to both reliability and security, 
and they cannot be dispensed with in any way. In fact, integrity, in the end, serves 
for the same purpose in both attributes to keep the information intact and valid. 
From this point of view, this thesis is addressing reliability and security in a 
unified fashion that is dealing with integrity and serves both error detection-
correction and security protection in a balanced trade-off. The first attribute, 
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reliability, deploys error correction coding, while the second attribute, security, is 
gained through cryptographic techniques.  
Interestingly, the first paper that tried to link both fields: cryptology and error 
correcting codes, in one algorithm was introduced in 1978 [90]. In that paper, 
MCEliece, tackled the use of Algebraic Coding mappings for cryptosystems.  
From that moment on, unfortunately, only a few attempts have been dedicated to 
investigate, examine and study such a joint approach until the last decade. 
 The reason for that is probably due to differences between the two targeted 
objectives. The first field is dealing with security issues, offering different security 
services, such as data integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation, 
which are the center of modern cryptography [91], while the second field (coding) 
dealing with controlling errors in data transmission over unreliable or noisy 
communication channels.  
However, in spite of those differences, researchers know the importance of these 
two areas (cryptography and coding). [93] concludes as follows : “ In 1997, the 
National Scientific Foundation (NSF) of USA recognized the need to bring the two 
research communities together in order to address mutual problems, challenges, and 
future development, and research from both fields were established. The report of 
their work addressed important issues from both error-correcting and cryptographic 
perspectives, and demonstrated several scenarios showing that the development and 
method from one field contributed to the development of the other. However, they 
took the general and widely accepted view, that coding techniques are mainly used 
for ensuring that the encrypted data are stored (or transmitted) without errors. In 
other words, they did not consider any possibility of combining cryptography and 
error-correcting techniques into a single procedure” quoting also from [92]. 
In 2006, a soft decryption method was proposed by Ruland et. al. [59] was as a 
first step towards using cryptography algorithms as a factor in improving reliability 
in the decryption process. Many other publications followed by the same authors 
which would be discussed in more details later on. Since that time, numerous papers 
have been devoted to propose more exact and robust schemes for reliability and 
security improvements. A theoretical treatment modeling “Cryptographic Error 
Correction” appeared 2006 as PhD thesis at MIT [75] presenting   “a new 
connection between cryptography and error correction” showing “best effort 
decoding” in a list decoding scheme which allows error correction beyond the 
classical barriers imposed by Hamming channel.  
In this thesis, the primary work is based on using pure cryptographic algorithms 
or joint scheme of the cryptographic and error correcting codes in order to improve 
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the system final error correction capability. The error-correction procedure adopted 
is using a “hard decision” procedure based on matching the highly-randomized 
crypto-function. This allows correcting errors beyond the error correction bounds 
based on the classical Hamming channel model. As a result the system authenticity 
could be enhanced/or degraded and even confidentiality through validating the 
content of the data after being corrected. Finally, the thesis is proposing a new 
approach designed to improve the availability of the cryptographic functions by 
replacing part of the security bits by error control coding bits, since the traditional 
cryptographic function has no reliability mechanism of its own.    
Motivations: 
The main reason that is attracting and motivating us towards using such 
techniques is the availability of cryptographic algorithms and error correcting codes 
in the same system, making us aspire to exploit these algorithms to increase and 
improve reliability. Additionally, the strength and solidity of the cryptographic 
functions in creating pseudo-random oracles, such as cryptographic hash functions, 
was also supporting towards usable high decision-certainty in our successive 
(experimental) error search scheme.  
In fact, joint coding-crypto functionality is not an easy task, and is complicated, 
difficult, and includes inherently threats to data contents when abused. However, 
the end resulting constellations appear quite promising for interesting future 
practical applications. The major interest of this research is targeting practical real 
field possible emerging future services.  
1.1 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The work in this thesis addresses a number of security and reliability aspects, 
including integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and fault tolerance. The primary 
contributions focus on providing error-tolerance mechanisms through pure 
cryptographic algorithms and then checking if the cryptographic functionality has 
been violated. Error-corrections (reliability improvement) by cryptographic 
algorithms often tend to end up equivalent to successful authentication attacks on 
the system. Evaluating (measuring) that aspect makes us understand how to deal 
with cryptographic algorithms and how they will act after being deployed in error 
correction mechanisms without abusing the purpose of the cryptographic functions. 
To our knowledge, this treatment is new in presenting practical prototype sample 
implementation scenarios in addition to their experimental evaluation. The thesis 
also presents a new best-effort error correction procedure using existing crypto-
functions leading to possible system-survival in some practical systems. The 
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survival with acceptable probability figures in such systems, having no reliability 
mechanism is achieved without any change to their cryptosystem structure.  
The thesis also presents a novel method for execution-error correction within a 
cryptographic AES cipher; where the proposed error correction algorithm is making 
use of some of the linear mappings of the cipher itself without additional error 
control mappings.  
In the next sections, four major categories of specific contributions are briefly 
described. 
1.1.1 A Fault Detection and Correction Procedure for AES Execution 
A fault detection and correction algorithm for processing the AES cipher is 
presented in this part. The errors that occur could be of natural sources or due to 
fault injection attacks. Extensive studies and investigations have been published 
during the last decade on the AES cipher in order to handle execution errors, but 
there is no proposal covering all possible errors affecting the ciphertext output. The 
maximum error correction capability (up to date) is introduced in [17], which has 
the ability to correct all odd bit-errors in a word of four bytes (32-bit).  
The algorithm for fault detection and correction proposed in this work offers the 
ability to cover a larger class of execution error possibilities up to 4-byte errors. The 
proposed algorithm is making use of the linear operations included in the cipher 
itself; without additional error control mappings. The procedure is making use of 
the properties of the two linear cipher transformations in detecting and correcting 
errors rather than incorporating additional error correction codes (ECCS). To our 
knowledge, this is new in the published literature. 
1.1.2  Error Correction by Using Crypto Hash Functions 
A cryptographic hash function is a highly non-linear mapping, which supports 
two security features: data-authenticity and data-integrity resulting with the binary 
answer yes or no. Reliability and error-tolerance is another feature not explicitly 
taken into account in many cryptographic systems. This thesis proposes a new and 
practical novel algorithm as a mechanism for improving system reliability by partial 
deployment of the existing cryptographic hash functions. The proposed new 
technique has been designed and evaluated experimentally to correct unidirectional 
and symmetric errors using the highly non-linear hash pseudo-random properties. 
The algorithm proposed is based on using the hash digest authenticity 
successively/experimentally as error indicator. The prototype model-algorithm 
demonstrates the ability to successfully correct a large share of a class of single byte 
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unidirectional errors. The same procedure is extended to cover symmetric error 
correction capability but at the expense of larger space and time complexity. The 
technique can be used in applications which include only cryptographic 
mechanisms without any adequate reliability procedures. The technique proposed 
has a special practical impact in providing best-effort (best-estimate) survival for 
units using flash based memory with unidirectional aging fault behavior with 
acceptable time complexity.  Due to the pseudorandom non-liner properties of the 
hash mappings, no precise error class can be corrected. However the share of 
correctable errors is quite high and therefore practically significant. 
1.1.3 Joint ECCs and Hash Functions to Improve System Reliability 
A new algorithm and practical strategy for improving the performance of an error 
correction codes beyond the minimum distance bound. The new proposed algorithm 
is based mainly on combining error correction codes (ECCs) and cryptographic 
functions, to improve error correction ability. The proposed error detection and 
correction model combines cryptographic hash functions and Reed-Solomon codes. 
The hash function controls the outer block, while the Reed-Solomon code operates 
on the inner block. The processing sequence is significant in that the inner error 
correction process is performed first in a successive manner, and then approved and 
authenticated using the outer hash-function with its high decision certainty.  The 
algorithm proposed showed experimentally the ability to correct a large share of 
triple byte errors and detect correspondingly quadruple byte errors.   
1.1.4 Improving System Reliability of Cryptographic Hash Functions 
The traditional cryptographic hash function offers authenticity with a very high 
degree of confidence, but without any contribution to error tolerance. In this part, a 
technique is proposed to improve system reliability by partial substitution of some 
hash function bits. The proposed technique does not need to enlarge/change the data 
format (or channel pass-through) of the system. Contemporary hash digests are 
over-dimensioned to comply with security standards. Therefore, a small part of the 
digest bits can be substituted by a coding redundancy check instead.  This would 
allow system reliability improvement (error tolerance) with a slightly or negligible 
reduction in authenticity level of the hash function. The sample system model 
proposed in this thesis has the ability to correct double byte errors and detect triple 
byte errors with minor degradation of the overall system authenticity.   
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A FAULT TOLERANT PROCEDURE FOR AES EXCUTION 
In November 2001, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
announced the Rijndael algorithm as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1]. 
From that moment on, numerous papers were published pointing out the most 
feasible methods to improve the reliability and security of the AES cipher. In 
addition, they attempted to reduce the size and delay time of this cryptosystems 
hardware implementation.  
 The AES cipher has a simple structure, since the permutation and substitution 
operations are used rather than mathematical functions as in asymmetric key 
encryption algorithms. Moreover, it is faster than many ciphers in software 
execution and works efficiently with hardware resources [2].  
The AES algorithm is still widely used today in many applications such as 
automated teller machines, smart cards, cell phones, digital video recorders, 
satellites, wireless keyboards, routers, wireless LANs, etc. 
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The execution errors caused by natural occurrences or malicious attacks can 
affect the reliability and security of a cryptosystem. AES cipher can be deployed 
even for detecting and correcting execution errors by making use of its linear 
mappings. 
For instance, radiation in space may results with errors which change the state of 
the bits in the AES algorithm [3], [4]. Changes in state of a single bit are called 
single event upsets (SEU). Such a flip of one or multiple bit(s) propagates through 
an avalanche effect on the ciphertext to yield a completely different and invalid 
output. 
Furthermore, malicious errors like fault injection between rounds or 
transformations in the AES can manipulate sensitive information. The key idea of 
attacking by fault injection is to change the behavior of the AES operations to 
enable the attacker to obtain valuable information via side channel attack. 
Therefore, leakage of sensitive information should be limited or prevented 
whenever possible. 
In this chapter, a simple error detection and correction algorithm for ShiftRow 
(SR) and MixColumn (MC) transformations is proposed. The simplicity stems from 
using two linear operations, exclusive-or and shift, to detect errors in the merged 
transformations (SR and MC). Furthermore, the process of locating and correcting 
errors is accomplished using linear operations and error syndrome bits. The 
syndrome bits are extra information stored as temporal bits, which are erased once 
the error detection and/or correction procedures are completed.  
The idea behind this work is to provide a model which guarantees high fault 
coverage within the 4 blocks of each 32-bits in the ShiftRow and MixColumn 
states. In the real world, everything has a cost. A high fault coverage algorithm is 
complicated in design, difficult to implement and may be costly, but depending on 
the application such cost may be viewed as acceptable to achieve high fault 
coverage.  
Note that two assumptions must be taken into consideration with the new 
algorithm. Firstly, the round and private keys must both be protected and kept error-
free. Secondly, the input bits of the state matrix assumed to be always error-free. 
2.1 STATE OF THE ART OF FAULT DETECTION AND 
CORRECTION TECHNIQUES IN EXCUTING AES ALGORITHM 
Deploying error detection and/or correction codes for executing cryptosystem, 
can be used to improves the reliability of the encrypted information and protect it 
from being compromised by an attacker. In recent years, several approaches have 
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been proposed for achieving fault detection and sometimes correction for the AES 
cryptographic system. In this section, we give a brief overview of these approaches 
in different domains. 
A single event upset (SEU) caused by high energy neutrons is detected and 
corrected in the on-board AES implementation described in papers [5] [6] [7]. The 
authors proposed using a Hamming code (8, 4) with 8 data bits and 4 check bits to 
correct a single bit error in each byte of the AES transformation. The same work 
was done in [8] [9] [10], where the Hamming code (12, 8) was used to correct an 
SEU.  
A compact 32-bit AES encryption/decryption process, including on-line test 
detection was proposed in [11]. A parity check is performed in all of the AES 
transformations to detect SEU errors. One parity bit is computed for each byte of 
the 32-bit word, resulting in a 36-bit word. This approach requires less hardware 
resources but consumes more time in the encryption process. In addition, it modifies 
the order of the transformations to become ShiftRow (SR), SubBytes, MixColumn 
(MC) and AddRoundKey (ARK). The reason for this modification is to merge the 
SubBytes (SB) and MixColumn (MC) transformations into a single transformation, 
which simplifies the implementation. The fault coverage is given as 100 percent for 
the expansion key, MixColumn, and SubBytes transformations, but only 88.4 
percent for the AddRoundKey and ShiftRow transformations. 
A hybrid scheme combining both hardware redundancy technique and parity 
checking for finding and correcting faults in the AES cipher is presented in [12]. 
This paper proposed the use of a parity check method for fault detection and 
location, while using hardware redundancy for fault tolerance. With this design, the 
fault coverage was given as 90 percent. 
A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) error detection method over Galois field      
GF(28) is proposed for the AES in [13]. This paper introduced several error 
detection schemes for the AES cipher. For these methods, the fault detection 
coverage was less than 100 percent, which implies the existence of undetected 
errors. The number of undetected errors is different from scheme to scheme 
depending on the number of redundancy check bits used. As the number of 
redundancy check bits increases, the probability of undetectable errors decreases. 
A concurrent error detection (CED) method against side-channel attacks is 
proposed in [14]. This method has three levels (operation level, round level and 
algorithm level). Errors are detected by performing the encryption (or decryption) 
operation followed by the inverse operation, decryption (or encryption), and then 
verifying that the result of the inverse operation is equal to the original data. This 
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method has very high fault coverage, but consumes more time and hardware 
resources, since duplication is required.  
In [15], the authors proposed two methods for detecting errors in AES 
transformations. The first one used error detecting codes (EDCs), and the second 
method deployed a redundancy technique. The EDC scheme was capable of 
detecting all single and multiple bit faults of odd order, but could not detect multiple 
bit faults of even order. The fault coverage was 99.997 percent. On the other hand, 
the redundancy technique was based on performing a test decryption immediately 
after the encryption and then determining whether the original data block is 
produced. This technique consumes time and hardware resources as described in 
[14].  
Paper [16] is an extension of paper [15] in which the authors extend the EDCs 
scheme to not only detect faults, but also locate transient and permanent single bit 
faults.  
Paper [17] is an extension of Bertoni’s works in [15] and [16]. The new 
algorithm proposed in this paper has the ability to detect and correct the most 
common errors injected with the intent of attacking the AES. The authors proposed 
associating a single parity byte with each word (4 bytes) of the state matrix. This 
parity byte is used to detect all errors affecting a single byte of the word, and correct 
single and odd multiple errors affecting one byte of the word. The fault coverage 
was more than 99 percent. 
A double-data-rates (DDR) AES architecture resistant against fault injection is 
introduced in [18]. The throughput of the DDR architecture is improved in this 
work, because it processes twice as much data per clock cycle. DDR performs error 
detection by using temporal redundancy. Some of the fault injection attacks are not 
detectable if the attacker is able to inject the same error value in the same location 
twice during a single round. In addition, the design cannot reach very high 
frequencies. The fault coverage of an even order was 99 percent, while the coverage 
of the odd order was 100 percent.  
A new method using polynomial residue number systems (PRNS) is introduced 
in [19] to protect the AES against side channel attacks and fault injection. By using 
PRNC, the byte based AES operations over GF(28) are decomposed into several 
parallel operations that use its residues over smaller fields. The parallelism 
characteristic of a PRNC method is significant, since it limits the ability of an 
attacker to gain valuable information. This method was capable of 100 percent 
detection of a single bit error and 93.75 percent for multiple errors.  
In this work, the proposed fault tolerant method is limited to the MixColumn and 
ShiftRow transformations. This is because a lot of work was previously done by the 
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other researchers for the SBox and AddRoundKey transformations, and it would be 
ineffective to reinvestigate their works. Some of these works have been presented in 
referenced papers [5-19]. Further works on the SBox transformation are described 
in the following section: 
The concurrent error detection (CED) technique is useful for protecting the 
advanced encryption standard algorithm against not only random and production 
faults, but also against side channel attacks as presented in [20]. The main idea 
behind this paper is to calculate the parity bit of the input value of the SBox and 
compare it with the parity bit predication generated from the output value of the 
SBox and vice versa. Finally, the results are examined to check if they were 
identical or not. This method guarantees the detection of 99.20 percent of errors. 
A fault detection technique for the SBox transformation is proposed in paper 
[21], in which the author suggests using multi-bit parity as an error indicator in the 
SBox transformation. These bits are used to detect malicious errors injected by 
attackers and natural errors caused by bit flips. In this paper, the SBox 
transformation architecture is based mainly on applying a composite field 
GF(((22)2)2) and mixed bases in order to reduce the space complexity of the 
transformation. The error coverage in the SBox state is 97 percent, which means 
that some errors are undetectable in this model.  
A structure-independent fault detection scheme for the SubBytes transformation 
was introduced in [22]. The authors in this paper proposed a detection scheme 
which is independent on the way of implementing the SBox/Inv-Sbox. The new 
scheme has the ability to detect most of the random faults generated in the SubBytes 
transformation.  The new scheme can detect 99.98 percent of errors occurring in the 
SBox transformation. 
2.2 THE AES ALGORITHM 
Advanced encryption standard (AES) is a secret key block cipher, which uses the 
same key for both process of encryption and decryption. AES is originally designed 
to support plaintext/ciphertext and key blocks of 128,192, or 256 bits. Although 
AES-256 should be more secure than AES-128, it is also slower as when the key 
length increases, the encryption time also increases [23]. Hence, based on the key 
length, the number of rounds Nr in AES cipher will be 10, 12 or 14 respectively. 
However, the plaintext/ciphertext is actually organized in a two dimensional 
array of bytes of size 4-by-Nb called the state array S, where Nb is the number of 
columns of the state S [1].  
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Note that in this work the key length of 128 bits (AES-128) is used as a model 
design reference. Each column in the state array S, contains four bytes (32-bit) is 
denoted by a word.  
As a corollary, ten rounds are needed for performing the encryption/decryption 
process. In reference to Figure 2.1, each round of the AES cipher (except for the last 
one) consists of four transformations (ARK, SubBytes, SR and MC). The SubBytes 
transformation is a non-linear transformation while the others are linear 
transformations.  
Plaintext 
AddRoundKey 
SubBytes 
ShiftRows 
MixColumns 
AddRoundKey 
SubBytes 
ShiftRows 
MixColumns 
AddRoundKey 
SubBytes 
ShiftRows 
AddRoundKey  
Ciphertext 
Key 
Key Expansion 
& Key Register 
Nr Rounds 
K(0) 
K(1) 
K(Nr -1) 
K(Nr) 
 
Figure 2.1: AES Encryption Algorithm 
Likewise, the decryption process is similar to the encryption process except that 
the incoming data is the ciphertext of the encryption process. The sequence of 
rounds for the decryption process is however set in reverse order in difference to 
that used for the encryption process. 
Note: In this work, the operations  and  mean addition and multiplication 
module 2 in the Galois field GF(2), while the operation • means multiplication in 
the Galois field GF(28). 
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2.2.1 AddRoundKey Transformation 
The add round key transformation (ARK) is a simple linear exclusive-or operation 
between the round key state (RK) and the working state (S), where the round key 
state is derived from the secret key according to the key scheduling process and 
added to the working state during each round. 
In equation form, the ARK transformation can be written as follows: 
)1.2(,,, crcrcr RKSARK   
Where r, c is the row and column index of the state respectively, with 0 ≤ r < 4 and 
0 ≤ c < Nb.  
The add-round-key transformation is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
2.2.2 SubBytes Transformation 
The substitution bytes transformation (SBox) is a non-linear byte substitution 
operation that depends on two factors. The first one is the multiplicative inverse over 
the finite field GF(28), and the second one is the affine transformation over GF(2).  
The SubBytes transformation substitutes each byte Sr,c in the state array S with 
another new byte SBoxr,c, according to the equation below:  
)2.2(631,, 

crcr SCMSBox  
Where CM is: a circulant binary matrix of the row vector [1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1] over   
GF(2). Sr,c-1 is the multiplicative inverse of Sr,c in the finite field GF(28) and r, c are 
the row and column numbers respectively . The value 63 is a constant hexadecimal 
value.  
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Figure 2.2: AddRoundKey Transformation  
In matrix form, equation (2.2) can be expressed as shown below: 
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Figure.2.3. illustrates the substitution byte operation from S to SBox state. 
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Figure 2.3: SubBytes Transformation  
The T-box approach is a technique known to merge two transformations: the non-
linear transformation (SubBytes) and the linear transformation (MixColumn) into a 
single block know as T-box. It requires more hardware resources and relatively high 
latency in compassion to the Sbox approach [25]. 
An important point worth mentioning is that, in this work, the SBox is utilized 
rather than TBox for two reasons. First, SBox implementations have better 
performance in terms of latency, area and throughput in comparison with those of 
TBox [24]. Second, when the TBox approach is used, it prevents the proposed 
algorithm from merging ShiftRow and MixColumn transformations into one block. 
2.2.3 ShiftRows Transformation  
The shift rows (SR) transformation is a simple linear diffusion operation used to 
scramble the data content by cyclically shifting the rows of the state matrix by a 
number of different offsets (bytes). The first row in the state matrix is not shifted 
while the second row is shifted left by one byte, and the third and fourth rows are 
shifted left by two and three bytes respectively, giving the new state SR. Figure 2.4 
illustrates the shift rows transformation.  
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Figure 2.4: ShiftRows Transformation 
To see how the transformation can be mathematically expressed, assume that the 
SBox state is the input one, then shift rows transformation proceeds as follows [1]: 
)4.2(040mod)),((,, NbcandrforSBoxSR NBNbrshiftcrcr    
Where r, c is: the row and column index of the state respectively.  In matrix form, 
Figure 2.4 can be expressed as shown below: 
)5.2(matrixmatrix ISBoxSR   
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2.2.4 MixColumns Transformation  
A high diffusion operation in columns instead of rows is used in the mix columns 
(MC) transformation to dissipate the statistical structure of the plaintext over long 
strings of ciphertext characters.  
The mix columns state is calculated by multiplying the state output SR by a 
predefined matrix MDS over finite field GF(28).  
 
)6.2( SRMDSMC      
 
The predefined matrix is a circulant maximum distance separable matrix (MDS) as 
indicated in [26]. In general, this matrix is generated by rotating each row vector one 
element to the right relative to the previous row vector. The maximum distance 
separable matrix can be expressed as follows: 
 
)7.2(
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
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Where the elements from GF(28) are represented in hexadecimal format. 
The maximum distance separable matrix is widely used in constructing error 
correction coding schemes as its columns are linearly independent resulting with a 
large minimum distance bound,  dmin = n – k +1 [26]. Thus, it can achieve the 
maximum level of error correction as a linear code. 
Note that, the mix columns transformation is performed in each round except the last 
one. Figure 2.5 shows the mix columns transformation.  
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Figure 2.5: MixColumn Transformation 
2.3 FAULTS DETECTION ALGORITHM 
A new methodology for fault detection based on simple linear operations for the 
ShiftRow and MixColumn transformations is presented in this section. The 
simplicity of this fault detection technique is in deploying just exclusive-or and shift 
operations than error correcting codes (ECCs) or other complicated methods.  
The algorithm design presented in this section may be sub-optimal in terms of area 
because the proposed algorithm offers an ability to cover a large class of execution 
error possibilities up to 4-byte errors. Several approaches have been proposed in 
published works with similar structures for fault detection only, but not for fault 
correction. An example of such a work is given in [17]. 
2.3.1 Faults Detection in SR and MC Transformations  
In coding theory, the traditional method for improving system reliability is to use 
an error detection unit first and once the detector output indicates error, the error 
correction step follows. The error detection unit is a parity check unit which verifies 
that the message bits have not been altered.  
In this section, the detection unit proposed for AES merging transformation (SR and 
MC) is based mainly on a method similar to that used by coding system.  
The proposed error-detection code uses the so called redundant check bits, which are 
generated temporarily from two different linear mappings (A and B). 
MixColumns 
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The first mapping A includes a linear diffusion operation, which multiplies the 
output of the MC transformation with an identity constant matrix over the finite filed 
GF(28). For this reason, the linear operation in A can be represented or performed 
using the exclusive-or operation between the elements of the MC state matrix. Note 
that the diffusion operation is performed on columns of the state matrix MC. 
The second part of the redundant bits is generated through different linear mapping 
B. The linear mapping B contains two different diffusion operations. The first one is 
the shift rows operations which is responsible for scrambling the Din (the output of 
the Sbox state) contents by cyclically shifting the rows of the state matrix by a 
number of different bytes. While the second diffusion operation is performed in 
columns instead of rows, through multiplying the output of the shift rows operation 
with a non-identity matrix over finite field GF(28). Note that the non-identity matrix 
has small coefficient values; therefore the redundant bits can be calculated by just 
using shifts and exclusive-or operations. 
After exclusive-oring the two redundant bits together, the syndrome bits result 
which are used as an indicator of the presence of errors in the MC and SR states. If 
no errors occurred during the transformation execution, the syndrome bits will be all 
zero, otherwise an error is detected and the syndrome bits have a nonzero value. In 
this case a decoding process is needed to correct the errors within the MC output. 
Recall that the syndrome bits are temporary bits of information that are omitted once 
the error detection and/or correction process are completed. 
Figure 2.6 shows the general structure of the error-detection method proposed for the 
merging transformation. 
The detection algorithm used in the merging transformation has a simple structural 
design and can be implemented easily. This is evident from the following facts: 
 
 The error detection unit can directly detect errors in the merging 
transformations instead of only in one state.  
 Ease of design: the error detection process uses only exclusive-or and shift 
operations for the purpose of error detection.  
 Linearity: the diffusion layer in the AES cipher has two consecutive linear 
transformations (MC and SR). This layer plays an important role in calculating 
the syndrome bits in a way similar to that of linear codes. 
 Employing only small coefficient within the MDS matrix will simplify the 
design and implementation of error detection and correction [27]. 
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Figure 2.6: General structure of the error-detection method proposed for 
                     the merging transformation. 
 
For simplicity, and to avoid using complicated indexing, let the state element Sr,c of 
the Sbox output be replaced with alphabetic symbols. Thus, the process of SR and 
MC transformations is described by letter symbols as shown in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7:  MC and SR transformations  
 
After the SR and MC transformations are executed, the output MC cryptogram is 
generated.  
Likewise, for simplicity let the elements of the MC state be replaced with cipher 
codes Cr,c, where r, c is the row and column index of the state, respectively, with      
0 ≤ r < 4 and 0 ≤ c < Nb.  
)8.2(
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Once the cryptogram MC is assigned, the detection unit begins checking for 
execution faults.  
Two distinct redundant blocks of parity bits RG1 and RH1 are generated in parallel by 
different diffusion processes. The first of these processes is dependent on the 
4 rows are shifted 
cyclically to the left by 
offsets 0, 1, 2 and 3. 
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exclusive disjunction or simply exclusive-or operation, while the second process is 
dependent on the shift and exclusive-or operations.  
In fact, the parity bits RG1 are constructed by multiplying the cipher codes MC with 
generator matrix G1 over finite field GF(28), where G1 is a 4-by-4 binary matrix.  
In mathematical form, the first process can be described as follows: 
)9.2(
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As the coefficients of the generator matrix G1 are binary elements with values of 
either 0 or 1, the multiplication over a binary field is equivalent to the addition 
operation. This means that the parity bits RG1 are formed by an exclusive-or 
operation as shown below: 
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In alphabetic form, the redundant bits RG1 are:
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On the other hand and at the same time, the second process starts to scramble the 
content of the SBox transformation. The scrambling process is performed by rotating 
the rows of the SBox state by offset 0, 1, 2 and 3 bytes respectively to form the new 
state Ds.  
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The parity bits RH1 are calculated by multiplying the parity check matrix H1 with the 
state Ds over finite field GF(28), where H1 is a 4-by-4 non-binary matrix. In 
mathematical form, the second process can be described as follows: 
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Likewise, since the parity check matrix H1 has small coefficient values of either 2 or 
3, the parity bits RH1 are calculated using shifts and exclusive-or operations as shown 
below: 
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Recall that the relation between the generator and parity check matrix over a finite 
field is the maximum distance separable matrix. Now it is easily seen that 
multiplying G1 by H1 produces the resulting MDS matrix because G1 is contained in 
H1 and G1 is a self-inverse matrix.  
                   
)15.2(11 HGMDS   
Once the redundant bits are calculated, the syndrome bits are formed simultaneously 
through the exclusive-or sums between the redundant bits RG1 and RH1 as follows: 
               
)16.2(      111 HG RRS   
According to the error syndrome bits S1, the detection unit can detect errors in the 
merging transformation. If S1 is a zero matrix, then the SR and MC transformations 
were executed without errors. Otherwise, there was an execution error, and the 
correction process should be applied. 
Note that each column vector (word) in the matrix S1 is used as the check bits for 
each word in the MC state.  
Based on the above observation, the error detection computation is performed at the 
operation level, thereby improving the error detection and correction, by localizing 
the faults in each transformation [14]. 
Figure 2.8 shows the fault detection and correction algorithm of the merging 
transformation. 
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Figure 2.8: Fault detection and correction algorithm in the merging transformation  
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2.4 AN ALGORITHM FOR FINDING AND CORRECTING 
EXECUTION FAULTS IN THE AES TRANSFORMATION  
In this section, attention is focused on the fault correction scheme since the fault 
detection scheme alone does not ensure the reliability and integrity of the 
cryptosystem.  
2.4.1 Execution Faults Correction in SR and MC Transformations:  
An efficient and effective fault locating and correcting algorithm for merging 
transformations is introduced in this section. The new algorithm is dependent on 
simple linear operations and redundant bits to locate and rectify errors of the MC 
state.  
As mentioned earlier, once the error detection unit detects that the syndrome bits S1 
have nonzero values, the error correction unit is invoked. The error correction unit 
generates syndrome bits S2 in addition to the syndrome bits S1 in order to locate and 
correct the faults. 
The error syndrome bits S2 are determined through the exclusive–or sums of the 
parity check bits RG2 and RH2 over GF(2). 
)17.2(222 HG RRS   
In fact, the computation of the redundant check bits RG2 and RH2 can easily be 
achieved by reusing the cipher code MC and the scrambled code Ds as shown in 
Figure 2.8. 
The redundant check bits RG2 are calculated by multiplying the generator matrix G2 
with the cipher code MC over finite field GF(28), where G2 is a 7-by-4 binary 
matrix. In matrix form: 
)18.2(22 MCGRG   
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



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
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
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
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44434241
34333231
24232221
14131211
2
1111
1010
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0110
1001
0011
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
RG  
As mentioned earlier, because the coefficients of the generator matrix G2 are binary 
elements with values of either 0 or 1, the multiplication over a binary field is 
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equivalent to the addition operation. This means that the parity bits RG2 are formed 
by an exclusive-or operation as shown below: 
)19.2(......
......
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In alphabetic form, the redundant bits RG2 are: 
)20.2(
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The redundant bits RH2 are formed by multiplying the state Ds by the H2 matrix over 
finite field GF(28), where H2 is a 7-by-4 non-binary matrix. In mathematical form 
both matrices can be represented as follows: 
  )21.2(22 SBoxSRHRH 
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Likewise, since the parity check matrix H2 has small coefficient values, the parity 
bits RH2 are calculated using shifts and exclusive-or operations as shown below: 
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Finally, the error syndrome bits (S1 and S2) are calculated and contain sufficient 
information to correct a certain corrupted word in the MC state.  
However, since each word in the MC state consists of only four bytes, the error 
syndrome patterns can be calculated offline and saved as a table. This table is used 
for locating and correcting execution errors in comparison with the syndromes bits 
(S1 and S2) calculated by the error detection-correction unit.  
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In fact, the values of the syndrome lookup table are dependent on the number and 
location of the errors within each word of the MC state. This means that the number 
of possible errors that occur within each word ranges from one up to a maximum of 
four errors.  
Since the entries in the matrices G1 and G2 are the identity element and the errors 
are computed for the MC state, the syndrome lookup table (SLUT) can be 
calculated according to those matrices.  
By comparison with the error value and its location, each column in the matrices G1 
and G2 is used to locate and correct a single byte error in word of the MC state.  
Locating and correcting double byte errors require the exclusive-or sums of two 
columns. The exclusive-or sums of three columns enable the algorithm to locate and 
correct triple byte errors. Quadruple byte errors are revealed if the syndrome 
columns indicate the errors are not single or double or triple.  
So by comparing the results of error syndrome vector (S1 and S2) with syndrome 
look up table, the error location and pattern are obtained. Therefore, the error in the 
cryptogram MC is corrected simply by exclusive-oring the word of the cryptogram 
MC with the error pattern at the corresponding error location. 
Table 2.1 shows the error syndrome pattern for single, double, triple and quadruple 
byte errors in each word of the MixColumn state. Note that the table entries are 
computed only after taking all possible error values and locations into account. 
After the correction process completes, the detection part is repeated again. The 
reason for checking the MC state again is to reduce or prevent the miscorrection 
cases [28].  
Note that the proposed algorithm for fault detection and correction for the SR and 
MC transformations is implemented as a model in a FPGA VLSI technology to 
explore the gate complexity overhead.  
The resulting FPGA hardware structures showed an overhead due to fault detection 
algorithm of around 26%. However when deploying fault detection and correction, 
overhead increased to 126% compared to the original AES algorithm. The error-
correcting version consumes a large amount of gate resources; this is due to the 
complex error correction procedure including the SLUT unit structure dedicated for 
estimating and locating errors in the output of the merging transformation. Note that 
the implementation is a straight forward implementation and is not optimized for 
low gate-count fabrication.  
A VHDL hardware description language model is implemented to realize the 
desired algorithm in the target Xilinx FPGA technology Virtex6 XC6VCX240T. 
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The original code of the AES cipher is taken from an open-source core. The 
prototype AES core is available at the www.opencores.com website.  
Due to time constraints, we adopted only the AES encryption process in this thesis; 
in a future work, the decryption part may be taken into consideration.  
2.5 UNDETECTABLE ERROR PROBABILITY 
An undetectable error case arises when the error detection unit sees the error 
code as a valid code. In this case, the undetectable error code would be uncorrected. 
In this section the undetectable error probability for the detection unit is calculated 
and simulated in order to prove the intensity of the proposed algorithm. Note that 
this calculation is based mainly on the assumption that the error does not occur in 
the redundant bits RG1 only, but also in the other part RH1.  
2.5.1 Undetectable Errors In The Merging Transformation 
According to the algorithm proposed in this chapter, the error syndrome tables 
can detect and correct up to four byte errors. Since the redundant bytes RG2, RH2 
with error syndrome S2 are used for error correction, the error detection method 
needs only the redundant bytes RG1, RH1 with error syndrome S1 to detect errors in 
the MC state.  
However, what happens if the errors occur not only in the merging transformation 
state, but also in the SBox or SR state or in the redundant bytes? 
The answer is that the syndrome S1 for certain multiple errors in the Sbox state or 
the redundant bytes could coincide with a zero value. In this case, the error 
detection unit (erroneously) passes the wrong word of the MC state. In other words, 
an additional error is added, and the error detection unit has failed in this case by 
allowing erroneous word to be considered as being error-free. The result of this 
behavior is undetectable errors.  
How many times does the detector fail to find errors in SBox, Ds, SR, RG1, RH1 and 
S1 for all possible errors combinations? 
Several cases of undetectable errors were found in our algorithm. These cases are 
calculated mathematically and also simulated. In what follows, a precise analysis 
and mathematical formulation of undetectable errors is presented. 
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2.5.1.1 Undetectable errors Case1 (One byte error in the redundant RH1)  
In this case the redundant RH1 has a one byte error and the word in MC state has 
three byte errors. The property of three byte errors in a word is that they have the 
same error pattern, meaning the errors are of equal value.  
For example, assume three byte errors (e1, e2, e3) occurred in the first word 
(column) of the MC state. These errors were localized in the state element C11, C21 
and C31 respectively, while C41 is error free (e4 = 0) as shown below:  
)23.2(
44434241
343332331
242322221
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

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Next, assume one byte error (e5) is induced in the redundant bytes RH1. 
After multiplying the matrix MC by G1, the redundant bytes RG1 are formed as 
shown below: 
)24.2(.....
...... R
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In this case, errors are induced in four different positions of the RG1 word. Since 
errors have the same patterns, then errors in RG2,1, RG3,1and RG4,1 are canceled out 
and do not affect the result, while errors in RG1,1remian present. Furthermore, if the 
error e5 (have the same error patterns as in e1) is induced into the redundant byte 
RH1,1 then the undetectable error case will occur. This case can be clarified with the 
equations below. 
FARCeCeCR
KFRCeCeCR
PKRCeCeCR
ePAReCeCeCR
HG
HG
HG
HG
23
23
)25.2(23
32
1,41,4
1,31,3
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

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0
0
0
0
321,4
311,3
211,2
53211,1
4141
3131
2121
1111




eeRRS
eeRRS
eeRRS
eeeeRRS
HG
HG
HG
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Where RGr,c and RHr,c are the redundant byte elements in the RG1 and RH1 matrices 
respectively, and r, c is the row and column index of the state, respectively, with       
0 ≤ r < 4 and 0 ≤ c < Nb. Where Sr,c is the error syndrome vector S1 and r, c is the 
row and column index of the state, respectively, with 0 ≤ r < 4 and 0 ≤ c < Nb.  
It is clear from the above results, the undetectable case will happen if and only if the 
errors have the same patterns such that: 
                                                  0eeee 5321   
Since the MC word is four bytes of data, then all possible combinations of errors in 
MC word are: 
)26.2(2 MCbwordMCinerrorsofnscombinatiopossibleAll   
Where bMC: is the number of bits in a word. 
Since the redundant bytes RH1 are four bytes of data, then all possible combinations 
of errors in RH1 are: 
)27.2(21 re
b
HRredundanttheinerrorsofnscombinatiopossibleAll 
Where bre: is the number of bits in the redundant RH1. 
For the reason that error patterns must be the same in the MC word, the number of 
errors having the same patterns in a word for all combinations is: 
)28.2(
)!(!
!)12(
BeBBe
Bm
rrr
rwordinpatternssamethehaveerrorsofNumber


Where      m: is the number of bits in each byte.  
            rB: is the number of bytes in each word.  
            rBe: is the number of error bytes having the same error pattern in each 
                      word of RG1. 
Thus, the probability of undetectable errors in case one for all possible 
combinations of the error patterns is: 
Chapter Two 
41 
 
)29.2(
det
1HRandwordMCinerrorsofncombinatiopossibleAll
wordinpatternssamethehaveerrorsofNumber
errorsectableunofyprobabilit 
 
In mathematical form, this can be written as follows: 
)30.2(
2
)!(!
!)12(
det
reMC bb
BeBBe
Bm
rrr
r
errorsectableunofyprobabilit 


  
Since m = 8 bits, rB = 4 bytes, rBe = 3 byte, bMC = 32 bits and bre = 32 bits, the 
probability of undetectable error is: 
17
3232
8
105.52
2
)!34(!3
!4)12(
det  


errorsectableunofyprobabilit
 
2.5.1.2  Undetectable errors Case2 (Two byte errors in RH1) 
Theoretical analysis and simulation results showed that undetectable errors with 
two byte errors in redundant bytes RH1 comprise two cases. 
 
The first case: is that the MC word and RH1 both haves two byte errors and the two 
byte errors induced in the MC word have the same error pattern.  
For example, assume that the two byte errors (e1, e2) have the same error patterns 
and are induced in the first word of MC state and in the state element C11 and C21, 
respectively.  
)31.2(
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Next, assume additional two byte errors induced in the redundant vector RH1 are e5 
and e6. 
After multiplying the matrix MC by G1, the redundant bytes matrix RG1 is 
generated. 
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In this case errors are induced in four different positions of RG1 word. Since the 
errors have the same patterns, then errors in RG1,1 and RG2,1 are canceled out and do 
not affect the result, while errors in RG3,1 and RG4,1 are still there. Furthermore, if the 
errors e5 and e6 (have the same error patterns as in e1 and e2, respectively) are 
induced in the redundant RH3,1 and RH4,1, then the undetectable error case occurs. 
This can be clarified with the equations below: 
64131221
54131111
41221111
31221111
23
23
)33.2(23
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1,41,4
1,31,3
1,21,2
1,11,1
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Where RGr,c and RHr,c are the redundant byte element in the RG1 and RH1 matrices, 
respectively, and r, c is the row and column index of the state, respectively, with      
0 ≤ r < 4 and 0 ≤ c < Nb. Where Sr,c is the error syndrome vector S1, and r, c is the 
row and column index of the state, respectively, with 0 ≤ r < 4 and 0 ≤ c < Nb.  
It is clear from equation (2.33) that, the undetectable case will happen if and only if 
the errors have the same patterns such that: 
0eeee 6521   
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Since the MC word has four bytes of data, all possible combinations of errors in the 
MC word are calculated according to equation (2.26). And since the error in the 
redundant RH1 vector is two byte errors, then all possible combinations of errors in 
the redundant are computed according to equation (2.27). 
For the reason that the error patterns must be the same in the MC word, the number 
of errors having the same patterns in a word is calculated according to equation 
(2.28). Thus, the probability of undetectable errors for all possible combinations of 
error patterns is calculated according to equation (2.29). 
Since m = 8 bits, rB = 4 bytes, rBe = 2 bytes, bMC = 32 bits and bre = 32 bits, the 
probability of undetectable error is: 
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errorsectableunofyprobabilit  
The second case: is that the MC word has four byte errors and RH1 has two byte 
errors. The four byte errors (e1, e2, e3 and e4) induced in the MC word have the 
following properties: 
 021  ee  
                 02143  eeee  
For example, assume the four byte errors (e1, e2, e3 and e4) are induced in the first 
word column of the MC state and in the state element C11, C21, C31 and C41 
respectively.  
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Also assume another set of two byte errors induced in the redundant byte RH1 are e5 
and e6. After multiplying the matrix MC by G1, the redundant bytes element RG1 is 
generated.  
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In this case, errors are induced in four different positions of RG1 word. Since errors 
have special properties as clarified above, then errors in RG3,1 and RG4,1 are canceled 
out and do not affect the result, while errors in RG1,1 and RG2,1 are still there. 
Furthermore, if the errors e5 and e6 (have the same error patterns as in e1 and e2, 
respectively) are induced in the redundant RH1,1 and RH2,1, then the undetectable 
error case occurs. This can be clarified with the equations below. 
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0
0
0
0
4321,4
4311,3
64211,2
53211,1
1,41,4
1,31,3
1,21,2
1,11,1




eeeRRS
eeeRRS
eeeeRRS
eeeeRRS
HG
HG
HG
HG
 
Where RGr,c and RHr,c  are the redundant byte elements in the RG1 and RH1 matrices, 
respectively, and r, c is the row and column index of the state respectively, with 0 ≤ r 
< 4 and 0 ≤ c < Nb. Where Sr,c is the error syndrome vector S1, and r, c is the row 
and column index of the state, respectively, with 0 ≤ r < 4 and 0 ≤ c < Nb.  
It is clear from the above results, the undetectable case will happen if and only if the 
errors have the following properties: 
       04321  eeee  
                                               6453 ; eeee   
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0654321  eeeeee  
Since the MC word has four bytes of data, all possible combinations of errors in the 
MC word are calculated according to equation (2.26). Since the error in the 
redundant vector RH1 is two byte errors, all possible combinations of errors in the 
redundant are calculated according to equation (2.27). 
For the reason that the error pattern must be the same for two errors and different 
for the others in the MC word, the number of errors having the same patterns in all 
combinations is: 
)38.2(
)!(!
!)22()12(         
BeBBe
Bmm
rrr
r
patternssamethehaveerrorsbytestwoofNumber

  
Where  
    m: is the number of bits in each byte.  
    rB: is the number of bytes in each word.  
    rBe: is the number of error bytes having same error pattern in each word of RG1. 
Thus, the probability of undetectable errors for all possible combinations of error 
patterns is: 
)39.2(
det
1HRandwordMCinerrorsofncombinatiopossibleAll
wordinpatternssamethehaveerrorsbytestwoofNumber
errorsectableunofyprobabilit 
 
In mathematical form this can be written as follows: 
)40.2(
2
)
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

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Since m = 8 bits, rB = 4 bytes, rBe = 2 bytes, bMC = 32 bits and bre = 32 bits, the 
probability of undetectable error is: 
-14
3232
88
102.106
22
)
)!24(!2
!4()1(2)2(2
 = errors leundetectab ofy Probabilit 



 
In general the probability of undetectable errors in both cases is: 
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2.6 PROBABILITY OF MISCORRECTION FOR AES CORRECTION 
ALGORITHM 
In coding theory, when a correction unit corrects erroneous data to an incorrect 
value, and the correction unit indicates the data element has been corrected and is 
error free, then this case is called “miscorrection”. Miscorrection cases cannot be 
detected, since the correction unit assumes the corrected data value is valid. In this 
section the probability of the error correction case producing a miscorrection is 
clarified. 
2.6.1 Probability of Miscorrection in Merging Transformation: 
Further analysis of the simulation results reveals that the miscorrection case 
occurs only when errors of special types are inserted in three different positions of 
the error detection-correction algorithm.  
The first position is at the error detection unit. One or more byte errors in the MC 
state are sufficient to make the syndrome bytes assume a non-zero value. 
Accordingly, in this case, the detection unit announces an integrity failure and the 
need for the error correction process becomes apparent. 
The second position is at the correction unit. Inserting at least three additional errors 
or more to the syndrome bytes make the word erroneously corrected.  
The last position is at the error detection unit S3. Now, the erroneous correction to 
the word needs to be detected before proceeding to the next transformation. An 
extra error is inserted at a specific location in the detection unit in order to change 
the syndrome vectors to zero value resulting in passing the wrong word of the MC 
state erroneously. Once the detection unit determines that the corrected word has no 
errors, the miscorrection case has occurred. 
For instance, assume that the redundant bytes RH1 are error-free and a one byte error 
is occurring in the cipher codes MC in the element C11. Thus, after calculating the 
redundant bytes RG1, the error byte is diffused into three different positions in the 
RG1 vector as shown below: 
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FARCCCR
KFRCCeCR
PKRCCeCR
PARCCeCR
HG
HG
HG
HG
23
23
)42.2(23
32
1,41,4
1,31,3
1,21,2
1,11,1
413121
4131111
4121111
3121111




 
0
1,41,4
1,31,3
1,21,2
1,11,1
1,4
11,3
11,2
11,1




HG
HG
HG
HG
RRS
eRRS
eRRS
eRRS
 
Since the detection part has a non-zero value, the error correction process must be 
applied. Two syndrome vectors (S1 and S2) are generated in order to correct an 
erroneous word in the MC state as shown below: 
0
0
0
)43.2(
1,81,8
1,71,7
1,61,6
1,51,5
1,41,4
1,31,3
1,21,2
1,11,1
1,8
1,7
11,6
11,5
1,4
11,3
11,2
11,1








HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
RRS
RRS
eRRS
eRRS
RRS
eRRS
eRRS
eRRS
 
11,11
1,10
11,9
1,111,11
1,101,10
1,91,9
0
eRRS
RRS
eRRS
HG
HG
HG



 
Assume an additional error e1 is inserted in the positions S3,1, S4,1, S6,1, S7,1, S9,1  and 
S10,1 such that: 
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11,11
111,10
111,9
1,8
111,7
111,6
11,5
111,4
111,3
11,2
11,1
1,111,11
1,101,10
1,91,9
1,81,8
1,71,7
1,61,6
1,51,5
1,41,4
1,31,3
1,21,2
1,11,1
0
0
0
0
)44.2(0
0
0
eRRS
eeRRS
eeRRS
RRS
eeRRS
eeRRS
eRRS
eeRRS
eeRRS
eRRS
eRRS
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG
HG











 
By comparing with the syndrome table, we see the error in the MC word is a one 
byte error in the second position of the MC state (C21) with error value e1. In fact, 
the word in the MC state will be corrected to an erroneous code, since the syndrome 
patterns are changed mistakenly to a different pattern, such that: 
4141
3131
12121
11111
)45.2(      
CC
CC
eCC
eCC




 
According to the correction code in equation (2.45), the miscorrection case arises 
only, when the detection unit passes the wrong code as an error-free code. This 
happens only, when an extra error is added to the syndrome bits making its value 
zero. If we assume errors now occur in the redundant RH3,1 and RH4,1, then the 
miscorrection case occurs.  
14131121
14131111
41121111
31121111
23
23
)46.2(23
32
1,41,4
1,31,3
1,21,2
1,11,1
eFARCCeCR
eKFRCCeCR
PKRCeCeCR
PARCeCeCR
HG
HG
HG
HG




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0
0
0
0
111,4
111,3
111,2
111,1
1,41,4
1,31,3
1,21,2
1,11,1




eeRRS
eeRRS
eeRRS
eeRRS
HG
HG
HG
HG
 
Note that the miscorrection case is simulated and evaluated for 232 random error 
patterns in three different positions of the fault detection-correction algorithm. The 
simulation results show that the miscorrection case cannot happen. This is due to 
the miscorrection case occurring only after inserting errors of special type in three 
different positions of the fault detection-correction algorithm. Therefore, from the 
above analysis, the miscorrection case for the detection-correction algorithm is 
either extremely rare or impossible to happen. 
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ERROR CORRECTION BY DEPLOYING CRYPTO FUNCTIONS 
Non-volatile flash memory technology is widely used in numerous applications 
where data retention and reliability are significant in power-off situations. Such 
systems as optical and flash memory media exhibit in many applications a 
unidirectional error behavior such that all error bits are of one type, meaning either 
all flip from 1 to 0 or all flip from 0 to 1 producing the so called unidirectional 
errors. Such systems exhibit this type of errors due to aging and high number of 
access cycles over their lifetime [29] [95]. Error Correcting Codes (ECCs) can be 
deployed to improve the lifetime (endurance), reliability, and performance of such 
systems. However ECCs techniques are often not used in order to save cost and 
system complexity. The basic procedure in error correcting technique is to add 
redundancy bits to the message, which allow detection and/or correction of errors. 
 
(*) This chapter was published in a short form at:  [56] the IEEE International Conference on 
Communications Workshops (ICC), June 2013. This is a vast extended version including many new 
contributions. 
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Many ECC techniques have been used in flash memories, including Hamming 
Codes and Reed-Solomon (RS) Codes [30], [31]. Such ECC techniques are highly 
complex and costly in terms of redundancy bits, especially for high speed systems 
[32]. Therefore, many applications in mass-products do not use any ECC 
techniques. However, numerous commercial applications utilize hash functions as a 
signature required for security services.  
The objective of this part is to offer an option for making use of a portion of the 
existing hash bits to correct a class of byte-oriented unidirectional errors without 
making any changes to the existing system.  This work is not intended to propose 
better or alternative error correcting codes. The proposed technique deploys a 
portion of the existing hash bits to allow a best-effort system repair within the 
framework of the existing system architecture. In other words, the system life-time 
could (as a result) be prolonged in many cases with a scalable probability by 
making a trade-off between reliability and system security. The proposal is 
somehow “abusing” a subset of the hash bits for the sake of error correction. This 
would certainly degrade (mostly non-significantly) the system authentication level. 
However, in many applications the size of the hash value is over-dimensioned, 
which allows reducing the number of hash bits without a significant loss in the 
authentication level. Example of possible applications of this technique include 
resolving criminal cases or system salvation where ECCs is missing in defective or 
damaged units by offering possible best-effort system remedy alternatives when no 
other repair options are available. Notice that, not all error patterns in this basically 
experimental technique are correctable. However our investigations showed that a 
practically significant large share of errors is correctable. 
As the class of unidirectional errors is relatively small, correcting unidirectional 
errors requires less number of successive attempts to get the best effort error case 
corrected compared to symmetric errors. The proposal is extended and evaluated to 
cover symmetric errors showing that in such cases the share of both uncorrectable 
errors and decoding complexity are consequently much higher. 
3.1 STATE OF THE ART IN USING CRYPTO-FUNCTIONS FOR 
ERROR CORRECTION 
Many error correction techniques for deploying cryptographic functions and 
particularly hash functions have been proposed in public literature in the recent 
years. The efficiency of joint channel coding and cryptography was discussed and 
analyzed in terms of security and error control for Short Message Service (SMS) 
applications in [33]. Joint channel coding and cryptography were proposed to 
improve the coding gain for the decoding algorithm [34] [35]. Cryptographic hash 
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functions were also used in concatenation with RS/Convolutional code [Soft Input 
Soft Output (SISO)] to detect and correct errors by soft decision using the so called 
Soft Input Decryption technique (SID)[36][37].  
To the knowledge of the author, there are no published investigations on hard 
decision error correction capabilities deploying purely crypto functions for 
symmetric and asymmetric or unidirectional error models.  
3.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS 
Cryptographic hash functions are one-way hash functions designed “hopefully” 
to be collision resistant. Cryptographic hash functions are useful in verifying the 
authenticity and integrity of a message by evaluating the hash digest. It is 
computationally infeasible for an adversary to find a distinct message such that they 
have the same output [40].   
The reason for that is the cryptographic hash functions are designed to be very 
difficult to reverse, and the only approach to finding the original message or a 
collision is to use a brute force attack method. Such an attack requires a 2n-bit 
experimental computation to find a different message hashing to the same output, 
where n-bit is the number of hash bits [38].  
This means that the attacks may take a relatively long time to reach their targets, 
depending on the message digest length n. Many types of hash functions are 
designed with different size message digests, ranging from 64-bit up to 1216-bit 
[39].  Two examples of such functions are MD5 and SHA-1, which generate 
message digest lengths as output: 128-bit and 160-bit, respectively.  
In this chapter and beyond, MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions are adopted as model 
design references in our proposed correction algorithm.  
We chose these two algorithms because they are fast, easy to implement, and they 
have a moderate (rather small!) message digest length, which is important in error 
correction and calculating the probability of miscorrection and collision. As the 
hash digests length increases, the time required for error detection increases as well. 
These two functions are becoming gradually out of date however, have been widely 
used in many practical applications. Comparable or rather better performance is 
expected when using any other standardized modern hash functions. 
Chapter Three 
 
53 
 
3.3 MD5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTION 
Message Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5) is one of the cryptographic message digest 
algorithms developed by the MIT laboratory for computer science and RSA data 
security incorporation. It was originally designed by Ronald Rivest in 1992 to 
replace an earlier hash function MD4 [41].  
The MD5 hash function is designed for digital signature applications, such as 
internet secure transactions, security-related applications, etc. It is executed in 
efficient way on 32-bit machines because the algorithm MD5 does not demand any 
large substitution table.  
The MD5 algorithm is known to have some weaknesses. For example, in 1996 a 
flaw was found in MD5’s design, and in 2004 MD5 was considered as “broken.” 
Xiaoyun, W. and Hongbo, Y. discovered that the MD5 hash function is not 
collision-resistant, which means that the MD5 hash function cannot offer any 
guarantee to protect any system against some forms of malicious tampering [42]. 
3.4 MD5 ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION 
The MD5 hash function takes a string of arbitrary length as input and generates a 
fixed length digest as output. It produce a 128-bit (16-byte) output string, typically 
expressed in hexadecimal format as a 32-bit hex string. 
The MD5 algorithm works in one direction with the property that the hash digest 
does not depend on the input message at all, as a single bit change in the original 
message will yield a totally different hash digest. 
To compute the hash digests of the MD5 algorithm, five steps are required and 
listed below [41]: 
1- Append Padding Bits  
2- Append Length 
3- Initialize MD5 Buffer 
4- Process Message in 16-Word Blocks 
5- Produce Output 
3.4.1 Append Padding Bits 
The first step of the MD5 algorithm in forming the hash digest is to 
append padding bits. Appending padding bits means that the message is 
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extended or “padded” so that the message length is congruent to 448-bit 
modulo 512-bit.  
The padding bits operation is performed by simply adding a single bit “1” 
to the end of message, followed by as many “0” bits as are required to 
make the length (in bits) of the original message and the padding bits 
congruent to 448-bit modulo 512-bit. 
Note that the Padding operation is always performed even if the length of 
the message is already congruent to 448-bit modulo 512-bit.  
3.4.2 Append Length 
The next step in computing the hash digest is to calculate the length of the 
message, excluding the padding bits, and add the length that is calculated 
to the results of the previous step, “Appending Padding Bits.” 
An important point worth mentioning is that the maximum size of the 
message length is 64-bit. Thus, the resulting overall length after appending 
the length to the result of section 3.4.1 is equal to a multiple of 512-bit. In 
other words, this means that the message length is an exact multiple of 16 
(32-bit) words. Note that the low order byte of the 64-bit message length 
is firstly appended to the message, then followed by the next highest order 
byte, and so on. 
3.4.3 Initialize MD5 Buffer 
Four-word buffers named (a0, b0, c0, d0) are used to hold the intermediate 
and final results of the MD5 hash function while calculating the hash 
value. Each one of these buffers can hold a maximum of one 32-bit word. 
These buffers are initialized to specific hexadecimal values as shown in 
Table 3.1 [41]: 
32-bit 
register
32-bit register 
values (Hex)
Covert the register value to 
be the low order byte first
Convert the regier value in low 
order to decimal format
a0 01 23 45 67 67 45 23 01 1732584193
b0 89 ab cd ef ef cd ab 89 4023233417
c0 fe dc ba 98 98 ba dc fe 2562383102
d0 76 54 32 10 10 32 54 76 271733878
 
Table 3.1 Initializing four-word buffers (a0, b0, c0, d0) 
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3.4.4 Process Message in 16-Word Blocks 
The fourth step in computing the hash digest is important, because 
different operations are performed in this step during every alternate cycle 
to generate in the end an authentic signature of the original message. 
In this step, the 512-bit message block that is produced in section 3.4.2 is 
divided into 16 sub-blocks of 32-bits each, denoted as Me[j], where          
0 ≤ j ≤ 15. These blocks then go through four different rounds, where each 
round consists of 16 iterations responsible for updating the contents of the 
four registers named (A, B, C, D).  
Updating the contents of these registers is done by performing four 
different functions (F) on each of the sub-blocks in order to avoid a 
collision case and generate an authentic updated version. 
These functions (F) take as input three 32-bit words and generate as output 
one 32-bit word and are defined below [43]: 
)1.3(150)()(),,(  iifDBCBDCBF
)2.3(3116)()(),,(  iifDCDBDCBF
)3.3(4732)(),,(  iifDCBDCBF
)4.3(6348)((),,(  iifDBCDCBF  
Where the terminology ,,¬ and  means the AND, OR, NOT and XOR 
operations, respectively, and i is the iteration number. 
The four word registers (A, B, C, D) are initialized at first with the values 
of the four buffers (a0, b0, c0, d0) as shown below [43]: 
)5.3(0aA 
0bB 
0cC 
0dD   
Once the first iteration of the first round is finished, the values of the four 
registers (A, B, C, D) are updated according to the following equations 
[43]: 
)6.3(CD 
BC 
)),,((( sMeKDCBFABB 
DA   
Chapter Three 
 
56 
 
Where A, B, C and D are the four 32-bit registers and k: is the sine 
function for the i-th iteration multiplied by two to the power 32 as defined 
below [41]:  
               )7.3(2))1(sin( 32 iik  
Where i: is in radians mode, with 0 ≤   i ≤ 63. 
Me: is a sub-block word at the ith iteration and s: is the left shift value 
specified by the MD5 hash function. 
Once the first iteration in the first round is performed, another iteration is 
started. After the 64 iterations of the four rounds are finished, the pre-final 
version of the cryptographic hash digest is formed and stored in the 
registers (A, B, C, D). 
Finally, an additional operation is performed on a mix of the new results 
of the registers (A, B, C, D) and the original values of the four buffers (a0, 
b0, c0, d0) to produce the final version of the hash digest 128-bit message 
authentication code [41]. 
 
)8.3(00 Aaa 
Bbb  00
Ccc  00
Ddd  00  
 
Figure 3.1 shows a single iteration of the total loop which calculates the 
values of the registers (A, B, C, D). 
3.4.5 Produce Output 
This is the last step in computing the hash digest. In this step the message 
digest produced by section 3.4.4, is simply reordered starting from the low 
order byte of register A and ending with the high order byte of register D 
to form the message digest of the MD5 algorithm. 
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<<< s 
F 
Me [i] 
K [i] 
 
Figure 3.1: The first iteration in the first round of the MD5 Algorithm [43] 
3.5 SHA-1 CRYPTOGRAHPIC HASH FUNCTION 
SHA-1 is a cryptographic hash function designed by the National Security 
Agency (NSA) and standardized by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in 1995 [44]. 
The acronym SHA stands for "Secure Hash Algorithm," which consists of four 
SHA algorithms that are structured differently and are named SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-
2, and SHA-3 respectively.  
SHA-0 is the original version of the 160-bit hash function published in 1993 under 
the name "SHA"; it was not adopted by many applications [45]. In 1995, SHA-1 
was introduced by the NIST to correct an error in the original SHA hash 
specification that led to a significant weakness. Otherwise, SHA-1 is very similar to 
SHA-0.  
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In 2005, a cryptanalyst “Schneier” found an attack on SHA-1 suggesting that the 
algorithm might not be secure enough for ongoing use, causing the NIST to 
announce a move to SHA-2 after 2010 [46][47]. SHA-2 is algorithmically similar to 
SHA-1, but with larger digest sizes. At present time, no successful attacks have 
been reported on SHA-2. In 2012, the NIST announced after long-running 
competition a new cryptographic hash functions known as SHA-3 [48] [49].   
However, Microsoft and Google announced in 2013 and 2014, respectively, that 
SHA-1will never be used as a certificate in SSL layer [50] [51]. Mozilla is also 
planning to stop accepting SHA-1 as a certificate by 2017 [52] [53] [54]. 
However, although usage of the SHA-1 hash function has stopped in some 
applications, it is still used in others such as verifying old digital signatures and 
time stamps, generating and verifying hash-based message authentication codes 
(HMACs), key derivation functions (KDFs), and random bit/number generation 
[55].  
3.6 SHA-1 ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION 
SHA-1 is a cryptographic hash algorithm which produces a 160-bit (20-byte) 
hash value, typically represented as a 40-digit hexadecimal number. 
The security provided by SHA-1 is based on principles relatively similar to those 
used by the MD5 message digest algorithm, but with a 160-bit message digest 
length which provides a significant margin of safety over MD5’s digest. The SHA-1 
algorithm works on a fixed size message block and produces an independent digest 
message of condensed size as output. 
SHA-1 requires five steps to produce the hash digest: 
1- Initialize SHA-1 Buffer. 
2- Append Padding Bits. 
3- Append Length. 
4- Process Message in 80-Word Blocks. 
5- Produce Output. 
3.6.1 Initialize SHA-1 Buffer 
The first step in calculating the SHA-1 hash digest is to initialize the 
hashing buffers. Five word size buffers named (h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) are used 
to hold the intermediate and final results of the SHA-1 hash function while 
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calculating the hash value. These buffers are initialized to a specified 
hexadecimal values as shown in Table 3.2 [44]: 
32-bit 
register
32-bit register 
values (Hex)
Covert the register value to 
be the low order byte first
Convert the regier value in 
low order to decimal format
h0 01 23 45 67 67 45 23 01 1732584193
h1 89 ab cd ef ef cd ab 89 4023233417
h2 fe dc ba 98 98 ba dc fe 2562383102
h3 76 54 32 10 10 32 54 76 271733878
h4 f0 e1 d2 c3 c3 d2 e1 f0 3285377520  
Table.3.2 Initializing five word size buffers (h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) 
Note that each buffer can hold at maximum a single 32-bit size word. 
3.6.2 Append padding bits 
The next step of the SHA-1 algorithm is appending padding bits. This step 
is the same as that for the MD5 hash function (Section 3.4.1). Appending 
padding bits means that the message sequence is extended and padded by 
several bits until it becomes congruent to 448-bit modulo 512-bit. The 
padding operation is always performed, even if the length of the original 
message is already congruent to 448-bit modulo 512-bit. The padding 
operation is performed by adding a single bit “1” to the end of the 
message followed by as many “0” bits as demand making the padded 
message length congruent to 448-bit modulo 512-bit.  
3.6.3 Append Length 
The third step in computing the hash digest is to calculate the length of the 
message, excluding the padding bits, and add the length that is calculated 
to the results of the previous step “Appending Padding Bits.” This step is 
the same as that for the MD5 hash function (Section 3.4.2). Note that the 
size of the message length is 64 bits. Thus, the resulting overall length 
after appending the length to the outcome of the preceding step is equal to 
a 512-bit multiple. In other words, this means that the message length is 
an exact multiple of 16 32-bit words. Recall that the 64-bit length of the 
original message is appended at the end and padded by “0-bits” in the case 
that the length of the message is less than 64 bits. 
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3.6.4 Process Message in 80-Word Blocks 
The fourth step in computing the hash digest is to divide the message 
block that is produced in section 3.6.3 into “chunks” of 16 32-bit words 
defined as w[i], where 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. Each of the 32-bit words is processed 
though different operations to produce the digest value SHA-1.  
An extension process for the 16-word produced above is first performed, 
which extends it into a new list of 80-word message blocks. 
The first loop of the extension process is to calculate word number sixteen 
w[16] through the exclusive-or operation between three different word 
numbers as shown below [44]: 
          )9.3(161483  iwiwiwiwiw  
Where i: is the iteration number and, in this case, equals to 16. 
After the new results w[16] is added to the words list, the next iteration is 
started to generate the next word w[17], and so on.  
Note that, after each calculation of the word w[i], a single left rotation is 
performed by adding a “0” bit to the beginning of the word and removing 
one bit from the end of the word w[i]. 
Once the extension process is finished, the new 80-word list is generated 
completely.  
Now, a new initialization is required for the five registers (a, b, c, d, e) 
with the values of the five buffers defined in section 3.6.1 as shown below 
[44]: 
 
)10.3(0ha 
1hb 
2hc 
3hd 
4he   
After the five registers are loaded with the new values, a new calculation 
is started through different f functions in order to dissipate the structure of 
the original message. Five rounds are required to cover the 80 words and 
make an update to the register contents, where each round consists of 
twenty iterations. The process of computing the f function for each round 
is defined below [44]: 
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)11.3(190)()(),,(  idbcbdcbf
)12.3(3920)(),,(  idcbdcbf
)13.3(5940)()()(),,(  idcdbCbdcbf
)14.3(7960)(),,(  idcbdcbf  
Where the symbols   ,  , ¬  and    means the AND, OR, NOT and 
XOR operations, respectively.  
As shown in the previous equations, the first equation is calculated in the 
first round, the second equation is specified for the second round, and the 
third and the fourth equations are specified for the third and fourth rounds, 
respectively. 
Note that after each iteration, the five registers contents (equation 3.10) 
are changed or updated according to the equation below, and then used 
again as an input for the next iteration [44]: 
)15.3(de 
cd 
30rotateleftbc 
ab 
 iwkefrotateleftaa  )5(  
Where f refers to the functions defined in equations (3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and 
3.14), respectively, k is a constant hexadecimal value and w[i] is the i-th 
word from the 80-word list. 
Once the four rounds have finished, a new initialization is performed for 
the five buffers as shown below [44]: 
)16.3(00 ahh 
bhh  11
chh  22
dhh  33
ehh  44  
Recall that if the word exceeds a size of 32 bits, then this word must be 
truncated before moving to the next step. 
Figure 3.2 shows the method for calculating the values of the five registers 
for the first iteration. 
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<<< s5 
F 
w [i] 
K [i] 
<<< s30 
 
Figure 3.2: The first iteration in the first round of SHA-1 Algorithm [45] 
3.6.5 Produce Output 
This is the last step in computing the hash digest. In this step, the 
messages digest produced by section 3.6.4 is converted into base 16-hex 
values and which are then combined to form the SHA-1 message digest. 
3.7 UNIDIRECTIONAL ERROR BEHAVIOUR MODEL 
Large classes of error correction codes have been found to deal with errors on a 
symmetric channel, where the bit error probability is equally likely in both 
directions; that is both error transitions 1→0 and 0→1 basically occur with equal 
probabilities. Figure 3.3 shows the crossover probability p of the binary symmetric 
channel.  
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Figure 3.3: Binary symmetric channel  
In the asymmetric case the two probabilities are different. When the error 
transition 1→0 happens, the error transition 0→1 is likely to happen, but with less 
probability and vice versa. Possible examples for that behavior are found in flash 
memories and optical channels.  
Figure 3.4 shows the crossover probability of the binary asymmetric channel, where 
p1 is the error probability for an input flipped from 0 to 1, and p2 is a possible 
different probability for an input flipped from 1 to 0.  In this case, either the 
probability p1 is larger than p2 or vice versa, since if one outcome occurs, the other 
outcome may still occur, but with less probability. 
In the unidirectional error model, either of 0→1 or 1→0 error transitions can occur, 
however both cases never occur at the same time in the same system. Unidirectional 
errors are common in some flash memories used in many contemporary mass 
products.  
The number of combinations of unidirectional errors (u-error) in each byte or data 
block depends on the type of the unidirectional error transition and the number of 
bits having the same type (0 or 1). Therefore, the total number of possible u-error 
combinations in a block of data can be computed as shown below [56]: 
               u-error = 2t-1                                                                             (3.17) 
Where t: is the number of bits having the same transition type in the block (ones or 
zeros). 
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Figure 3.4: Binary asymmetric channel  
3.8 ERROR CORRECTION PROCEDURE BY USING THE HASH 
SIGNATURE 
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is often computed as a signature or 
integrity checking vector appended to the data under consideration. As a hash value, 
if the MAC is violated then either the data is not authentic, or it has been changed 
intentionally, or an error could have occurred. For the highest security level, 
systems usually deploy separate independent error-correcting ECC or error-
detecting EDC coding techniques. If such an ECC/EDC is not available, then the 
only indicator for errors, authentication and integrity is the existing hash value 
(MAC).  
The MAC/hash value is often larger than required for the designed authentication 
level. New standards (such as BLAKE-512, SHA-512, ECOH, FSB, JH, MD6, 
Spectral Hash, SWIFFT and Whirlpool) use up to 512-bit hash-values for 
authentication. As the length of the hash value increases, the number of possible 
messages and possible digests increases. This criterion is of significant importance 
for a strong collision model, which prevents the duplication of digest values [57]. If 
the available bits are partially used for correcting errors caused by bit flipping, then 
the total security level would be only slightly reduced as long as the corrected error-
class is kept small. In the worst case, such an error correction method may be seen 
as a successful authentication attack, which would probably not result in a corrected 
message, but instead with one that has likely been maliciously modified.  
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To start our investigations, modest small hash functions MD5 (128 Bits) and SHA-1 
(160 Bits) are considered for our experimental error correctability evaluation. Both 
functions are extensions of the MD4 algorithm [58].  
The proposed error correction procedure is based mainly on considering a violated 
hash-value as an indicator for existing errors. Error correction is assumed to be 
reached if a single non-violated hash value can be attained by flipping all error-
class-items in the selected unidirectional error-class. As the hash function is highly 
non-linear and does not follow the superposition principle, the error-search 
procedure is a bit more complicated than that of a usual linear code.  
Referring to Figure 3.5, the original sent data block of n-bytes Ds is mapped to the 
hash value Hs 
Hs = hash (Ds), having k-bits. 
The two blocks Ds and Hs are then concatenated to get what we would consider as a 
code word 
Code word = [ Ds ║ Hs ] 
                  Where ║: means concatenated bit streams.  
The Code word is sent through a channel and could be corrupted by some 
unidirectional errors. The received data Dr║Hr is assumed to be error-free and 
authentic iff (if and only if): 
Hash (Dr) = H0 = Hr 
In that case there is still a small probability that there remain some undetectable 
errors or changes which result in a valid hash value. The data in that case is in 
reality not authentic and a successful authentication attack may have occurred. 
      If        H0 ≠ Hr 
Then there is for sure an error or authentication is violated in Dr. In that case an 
error search procedure should be activated as shown in Figure 3.6 (Try to correct).  
   We assume throughout this work that both sender and legitimate receiver 
know all details of the hash function and possibly secret-keys required to 
compute it. 
The error reliability of the search procedure is actually estimated by dividing the 
digest bits Hr into two parts: the reliable redundant part HrE and the authentic part 
HrU. The first part, HrE is a small size bit string which is responsible for error 
handling. The second part, HrU, consumes the remainder of the string and is 
assigned as a safeguard against authentication threats that occur within the 
correction process.   
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Hr = HrE || HrU
 
Figure 3.5: Basic error detection procedure [56] 
The search procedure is started by experimentally flipping all possible error patterns 
in the selected class of errors in the data of the received block [Dr || HrE]. The 
technique is similar to the search technique deployed in the Soft decryption 
technique shown in [59]. 
  The error cases are now handled as sketched in Figure 3.6. Error patterns are 
checked in the following fashion: 
      [Dr || HrE] '  = [Dr || HrE]   (proposed error pattern) 
The partial hash values involved in error correction HrE may also be modified by the 
error pattern and is assigned as H'rE. 
            H'rE = hash ( HrE  ⊕ ej ),    where ej:  is one of the proposed error patterns. 
The basic check H'0 = hash ( Dr ⊕ ei ) is used, where ei:  is one of the proposed error 
patterns. 
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From the above discussion, it is clear that the search procedure has two search 
loops: the data-bit search loop and the hash-bit search loop. Both loops are 
independent of each other, which may substantially increase the likelihood of 
correcting errors quickly by using a parallel correction approach. 
So, an exhaustive search over all possible error patterns/items ei is performed for the 
message bytes Dr in order to correct a single byte error. If the error class item 
corrects the faulty bits, then this item is stored in the error proposal list, otherwise 
the algorithm proceeds to the next error:  
)18.3(.'
.'
10
0


irEE
irEE
eitmeclasserrornextthetomoveHHif
listproposalerrortheineitemclasserrorsotreHHif
 Once the correction process in the block Dr is finished, another process in the block 
HrE is started. The same procedures are recalculated for the block HrE, if the error 
class item ej corrects the faulty bits, then this item is stored in the error proposal list, 
otherwise the algorithm proceeds to the next error: 
)19.3(.'
.'
10
0


jrEE
jrEE
eitmeclasserrornextthetomoveHHif
listproposalerrortheineitemclasserrorsotreHHif
 
After the correction process is completed, the search procedure is also completed 
and decisions are made to accept or reject the proposed error corrections.  
The reliability of the correction process is measured or assessed by counting the 
number of corrected errors in the error proposal list. Consequently, three cases are 
considered to assess the accuracy and efficiency of the correction model. 
The first one is a collision error case. If the received block after flipping finds more 
errors resulting with H0E= H'rE or/and H'0E =HrE (that is, more errors map to the same 
hash value), then errors could be miscorrected. As the number of corrected errors is 
more than one, the correction situation will be ambiguous and unreliable.  
In the second case, no suggestion or deduction is given concerning the correction 
process. In this case, the errors in the block [Dr|| HrE] do not match any of the 
expected error class items through the correction process. 
The latter case is of particular interest, because it indicates whether the corrected 
code is authentic or has been altered. A single byte error is stored in the error 
proposal list, which holds a single solution after the completion of the search 
process. In this regard, if the remaining part HrU matches the expected value h(Dr), 
then the code word [Dr|| HrE] is corrected and considered as error-free without 
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confusion. Otherwise, there is an error detected in the corrected word, and the 
message is mistakenly corrected.  
Try to correct 
  Next error  
in Data 
No 
ei           Dr 
h(ei     Dr ) = H'0 
H'0= H'0E|| H'0U 
H'r = H'rE || H'rU 
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Figure 3.6: Error correction search procedure [56] 
 
In a real application, if the error corrections search result with a single proposed 
error from the SEC, the error is corrected and the whole hash is then checked to 
confirm it is violation-free, otherwise the error is not correctable. Notice that there 
is still a possibility that some errors could be miscorrected or yield a mapping onto a 
successful authentication attack case. This is of low probability occurrence, as the 
simulation results would show later. Note that there is a possibility to have an error 
in the authentic part, in this case the discrepancy checking between the two digests 
are sufficient to detect if it is a single or not.  
3.9 SOFT DECISION  CORRECTABILITY 
The knowledge of gradually appearing defective bits/bytes due to aging allows 
improvements in the error correction capability. With the progress of the number of 
write/erase access cycles in flash memories, a certain fluctuating threshold level is 
reached where the memory’s performance quality starts to degrade. More and more 
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errors will occur in fatigued bits/blocks, which are normally easy to locate. Locating 
such blocks in the time progress can be taken into consideration in the error search 
process and error-class selection. This represents a sort of helping information (for 
soft decisions) to reduce the number of flipped error searches, resulting in 
increasing the error correctability and, hence, the lifetime of the unit in use. Since 
the bit fatigue behaviour happens in a non-evenly distributed manner, we expect in 
most cases to increase significantly the lifetime of such devices by considering prior 
knowledge of the more probable error locations and patterns in the search 
procedure.  
3.10 THEORETICAL PROBABILITY OF COLLISION IN SYMMETRIC 
AND UNIDIRECTIONAL MODELS 
Perfect hash collision resistance means that two distinct inputs values x and y 
would not produce the same hash value. A collision happens if h(x) = h(y) for 
distinct different inputs x and y.  
Theoretically, there is always a chance that two different inputs might generate 
the same hash value. To estimate the collision probability in the error correction 
models, the number of colliding errors is estimated theoretically first and then 
compared with the simulation results in Table 3.3 for a random selection of the data 
block Ds.  
The terminology used in this section may differ from that utilized in [60]. However, 
the derivation of the basic probabilistic rules is defined as shown below [60]: 
K = 2m = the number of cells in the hash table. 
E = the number of distinct-items/errors hashed into the table. 
A = the load factor whereby: 
)20.3(/ KEA   
The load factor A is the ratio of the number of distinct-items/errors hashed into the 
table to the total number of cells in the hash table.  
The probability PEm that m-keys are mapped onto the same cell in the hash table if 
the kE hash sequences are equally likely is given in [60] by: 
 
)21.3(11 m
mE
EM KKm
E
P 





 


  
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Thus from the above equation (3.21), the total number of m keys (NmK) that are 
mapped onto the same cell in the hash table is equal to the number of cells in the 
hash table multiplied by the probability PEm [60]: 
m
mE
Em
K
Km
E
K
PKNmK






 




11
)22.3(
 
Initially, because k is larger than E, some of the cells inside the hash table are 
occupied with different items while others are not occupied and left as empty.  
Non-occupied cells (NNOC) are easy to calculate, as the term non-occupied means 
or refers to the number of cells which do not have any keys/items inside of them (m 
= 0), therefore the number of NNOC  cells is  [60]: 
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Note that, for simplicity, the term e-A can be simply substituted for the term             
(1 – 1 /K) E, as E and K are considered to be large. Thus, the NNOC is defined 
below [60] as: 
)24.3(.AeKNNOC   
According to equation 3.24, the number of occupied cells (NOC) is equal to the 
number of non-occupied cells NNOC subtracted from the table size K, which is 
defined below [60]: 
)1(
)25.3(
.
.
A
A
eK
eKK
NNOCKNOC


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In fact, the occupied cells may contain different items/errors in each cell. Cells 
containing a single item/error (a collision-free item) are referred to as single-key 
cells, while the other cells having two or more items/errors in each cell are called 
collision-key cells.  
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The number of single-key cells NSKC (collision-free) is computed by multiplying 
the probability PEm (equation 3.21) that a cell has a single key (m=1) by the number 
of cells in the hash table, as defined below [60]:  
1
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Note that a single-key item stored in a cell, through the error correction model 
means that this item/error is either corrected or miscorrected. Likewise, it is 
axiomatic that the number of single-key items is similar or equal to the number of 
cells having a single-key. 
Thus, the number of items involved in the collision case can be derived by 
subtracting the number of single-keys from the total number of distinct-items/errors 
hashed into the table. In general if a hash table has k-locations and E-distinct-
items/errors are hashed into these locations, then the number of expected colliding 
errors is Ccollision, where [60]: 
                            )27.3()11( Eollision K
EEC   
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As mentioned before, for a load factor of A= E/K (assuming K and E are large), the 
number of colliding errors can be approximated by [56]: 
)28.3()1( Acollision eEC
  
For E= 754 errors (Table 3.3) and deploying 16 hash bits (that is k=216), only 
Ccollision= 8.6 errors would probably collide out of 754 entered items. For E=4845 
with 24 hash bits, only Ccollision =1.4 errors would probably collide. With 32 hash 
bits, Ccollision =0.005 errors. Therefore, we can have high confidence that using a 
hash value of more than 40 bits should result in a negligible collision rate. These 
expected computational results agree with our experimental results summarized in 
Table 3.3.  
An important point worth mentioning is that the number of search cycles is 
associated with the types of errors, symmetric or unidirectional, because the number 
of possible asymmetric_error combinations in blocks of data (bytes) in a symmetric 
channel is more than the number of possible unidirectional_error combinations in a 
unidirectional channel. 
Therefore, the latter case requires less time to correct the error through the 
searching loop.  
However, to estimate the number of search cycles in unidirectional and symmetric 
channels, the number of errors for each class is estimated in a combinational way as 
follows: 
 
3.10.1    Size of error-class in Symmetric-Channel “Symmetric Errors”  
The number of search cycles is the total number of possible r-symbol errors in 
the symmetric error model. As each error pattern is compared with all possible 
errors of the selected model, the number of hash mappings involved for the whole 
error search is SC. 
Thus,the number of search cycles SC for symmetric errors is defined as: 
)29.3(ST VCSC 
 
Where CT : is the total number of r-symbol error combinations hashed during the 
correction in a code word having c-symbols [61]. In that case CT is: 
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If an m-bit symbol is taken as an element from GF(2m), then the number of all 
possible non-zero symbols is [56]: 
)31.3()12(  mSV
 
3.10.2 Size of Error Class for Unidrectional Channel “Unidirectional 
Errors”  
The number of search cycles in the unidirectional model is the same as in the 
symmetric model except that the number of all possible non-zero symbols is 
different [56]. 
)32.3(UT VCSC                                                                       
The only difference is in vu, which is approximately computed for the special case 
of unidirectional error transition which flips either from 1→0 only or from  0 →1 
only.  
Since our works are based on an m-bit data block, then the total number of possible 
different transitions (1→ 0 or only from 0 → 1) in an m-bit code word is defined in 
the equation below: 
)33.3(
)!(!
!
dmd
mSU 
  
Where m: is the total numbers of bits in each data symbol, and d: is the weight of 
the error pattern.  
This means that for a word of m = 8 bits, the total number of possible transitions are 
8, 28, 56, 70, 56, 28, 8, and 1 for single, double, triple, quadruple, quintuple, 
sextuple, septuple and octuple weight of error patterns, respectively. 
Now, since the total number of combinations of unidirectional errors is defined in 
equation 3.17, the total number of combinations for single through octuple 
transitions is shown below: 
u_error = 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127 and 255 respectively. 
As a corollary, the total number of unidirectional errors is equal to the sum of the 
total number of possible u-error combinations multiplied by the total number of 
possible transitions of a single type, as shown below: 
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Where m: is the total number of bits in each data symbol, and d: is the weight of the 
error pattern.  
For m = 8-bits,  
      TU =  1*8+ 3*28+ 7*56+ 15*70+ 31*56+ 63*28+ 127*8+ 255*1 = 6305 
Therefore, in general vu can be computed as the average number of unidirectional 
errors in a random stream of bits generated from a binary symmetric source as 
follows [56]: 
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Where m: is the total number of bits in each data symbol, and d: is the weight of the 
error pattern. Formula (3.35) is computed by dividing the number of all 
unidirectional errors for all m-bit symbols by the number of all non-zero m-bit 
combinations. For m=8, vu=24.71 combinations. This theoretical value for vu was 
verified by the simulation results in Table 3.3 for a random selection for the data 
block Ds. 
3.11 PROBABILITY OF MISCORRECTION IN THE ERROR 
CORRECTION SCHEME 
In coding theory, a miscorrection case is said to have occurred when the decoder 
corrects an erroneous code to a different code, and the decoder asserted that the 
code is correct and error-free [62]. The same assumption holds for error correction 
schemes used by crypto functions. As the correction process is carried out for a 
consecutive series of different data codes, the probability of having a miscorrection 
grows correspondingly. 
Practically speaking, a one-time correction loop is enough to restore the original 
data stream, but still far from proving or meeting the requirements of the 
authenticity criteria. In this case, the calculation of the probability of miscorrection 
is of significant importance, since the correction process involves modification of 
the data content. 
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Based on the above analysis for consistency checking, the error-correction 
strategy, from the perspective of attacking looks similar to preimage and second-
preimage attacks. In fact, the error-correction procedure is a brute force approach as 
during each iteration, the content [Dr||HrE] to be hashed is slightly changed to find a 
valid hash value. 
In order to understand this concept, let’s take a closer look into the error correction 
mechanism that takes place during the search steps. When the exhaustive search 
method for the block Dr begins, the block digest HrE remains unchanged at a certain 
value as long as the correction process is iterated. However, the block Dr is changed 
in an iterative manner looking for an identical hash digest.  
If an identical hash digest is found, even if just for one time in a message-digest 
corrupted with more than one error value, then an effective attack is possible.  
In the case that the authenticity check is approved, the correction process actually 
violates the data protection and resources dependencies. This mean that the message 
attributes have been altered, and the miscorrected case comes into consideration 
after the completion of an exhaustive search as shown below:  
rrriri
irEE
HDhDheDhee
listproposalerrorthein
eitemclasserrorsotrethentimeoneforHHif
completedissearchexhaustive
occuredcaseionMiscorrect




)()'()(:!
)36.3(.
,'0  
From the forgoing discussion, it is evident that miscorrection is a non-injective case 
(2-To-1) while authentic correction (the ideal hash function) is an injective case (1-
To-1). The existence of such non-injective mapping yields an impression that a 
miscorrection approach looks like a preimage attack [63]. This form of attack is 
based on finding two distinct inputs (Dr and Dr') having the same output Hr such 
that:  
                  )37.3()'()( rrr HDhDh   
As is clear from equations (3.36) and (3.37), the miscorrection probability is equal 
to the number of exhaustive search cycle in the block Dr divided by the time 
complexity of a preimage attack. 
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Dr = the number of data bytes (Data Symbols). 
m = the number of bits in a Byte of data (symbol). 
n = the number of bits in the Hash-Digest (Hr).  
Note: 2n is the time complexity of a preimage attack required to construct a 
violation message that is in fact illegal or invalid. 
By comparison, a similar analysis is carried out for the data string HrE. As the block 
HrE is changed, the message block Dr remains constant as long as the correction 
process is activated. Once a single match is found between the signatures H'rE and 
the message digest h(Dr), authenticity checking is performed. In the case that the 
authenticity is approved, an inauthentic message is mistakenly generated, which 
represents the miscorrection case.  
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Contrary to the preimage attacks, here the digest content is altered, while the entire 
content is still intact. Also, the mapping function of the miscorrection is   1-To-2  
not 1-To-1. This means that the miscorrection case, approached from the principle 
second-preimage attack [63], which is based on the exhaustive search strategy on 
finding two similar hashes (Hr and Hr') belong to the same entire Dr such that: 
)40.3(')( rrr HHDh   
As a corollary, and from equations (3.39) and (3.40), the miscorrection probability 
is equal to the exhaustive search cycle in the block HrE divided by the time 
complexity of a second-preimage attack. 
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HrE = the number of Hash bytes in the reliable part (Hash Symbols). 
m  = the number of bits in each Byte (symbol). 
n   = the number of bits in the Hash-Digest (Hr) 
Note: 2n is the time complexity of a second-preimage attack requires to construct a 
violation message that is in fact illegal or invalid. 
Figure 3.7 shows the relation between the correction method and the brute force 
attack. 
# Cells in the Hash table = 2Hrm 
Dr 
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Figure 3.7: The relation between the correction method and the brute force attack 
Finally, and since the correction decision is assumed to be reached if a single non-
violated hash value is obtained, this means that the error occurred in either the 
message or the hash digest content. Therefore, in general, the probability of having 
a miscorrection is equal to the number of search cycles for one-byte error correction 
in the block [ Dr || HrE ] divided by the time complexity of the preimage or second-
preimage attack. 
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The analysis above is clarified in the equations below: 
 
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In other words, the number of miscorrection errors is calculated by multiplying the 
load factor by the number of combinations of one byte error corrections.  
Dr = the number of data bytes (Data Symbols). 
HrE = the number of Hash bytes in the reliable part  (Hash Symbols). 
A  = Load Factor = N /M. 
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N = the number of distinct keys hashed into the table (input). 
M = the number of cells in the hash table. 
m = the number of bits in a Byte of data (symbol). 
n  = the number of bits in the Hash-Digest (Hr). 
3.12 SECURITY LEVEL DEGRADATION 
The overall security level of the system is in fact reduced due to “abusing” the 
HrE bits-share for error correction. The collision complexity of the authenticating 
hash function is 2n/2. After error correction the HrE bits cannot be considered as a 
part of the authentication bits as the corrected data has been adapted or 
“successfully attacked” to match the hash value. This could mean that the security 
level is reduced by the number of the bits of HrE which are used to correct a single 
byte error. In equation form the new security level SL can be defined as: 
      )43.3(2
2/)( reHnSL                           
Where n: is the number of the original hash bits and Hre: is the number of bits 
abused for correcting errors. 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the conjectured reduction model in security level from the 
perspective of a collision attack complexity. 
Since the existing security model of the hash function ensures the integrity of the 
information with a high probability. The correction process however, reduces the 
authenticity level additionally by the probability of miscorrection as it can also be 
considered as a security failure. As the miscorrection event can be interpreted to 
mean that the system has been attacked and unauthorized change of information is 
identified. This is a possible system-failure price with rather low probability to be 
paid for the remedy achieved in such cases.  
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. . . . . . . . . . . 
Time complexity of the collision attack = 2n/2, where n = | Hre  || Hru| 
 The hash bit size is 
reduced by = Hre-bit 
The new time complexity for collision attack is: 
 2 ( n - Hre) /2 
Bits for ECC Bits to autheticate the erorr correction process 
 
Figure 3.8: Security level degradation 
 
3.13 EXPERIMENTAL ERROR CORRECTABILITY FOR DIFFERENT 
HASH FUNCTIONS 
The error correction behavior of unidirectional and symmetric models utilizing 
MD5 and SHA-1 as hash functions was experimentally determined for different 
data blocks of length 16 and 32 bytes, and for different hash bits HrE of size ranging 
from 1 to 5 bytes deployed for error correction. The number of used hash bytes was 
intentionally reduced to observe the collision thresholds. 
Figure 3.9 shows the collision counts simulated for unidirectional and symmetric 
error models with the hash function portion deployed using 2 bytes for the MD5 
algorithm.  
As can be observed from the figure, the number of collisions for several different 
random data blocks (data1 to data 10) is, as expected, less in the unidirectional 
model than it is in symmetric model. This is due to the load factor and shape of 
errors in the data as well as to the hash value for each model. In the unidirectional 
model, the errors are assumed to occur in a byte in the same direction (either from   
0 → 1 or from 1 → 0), while in the symmetric model, the errors occur with equal 
probability in both directions (from 0 → 1 and 1 → 0). 
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Figure 3.9: Collision counts for MD5 [56] 
 
Figure 3.10 shows the simulation results for the single-byte non-correctable error 
probability (collision case) of 16-byte data blocks as a function of the hash digest 
size used for the MD5 and SHA-1 hash-functions.  
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Figure 3.10: Probability of non-correctable errors for 16 data bytes [56] 
 
 
Where, Figure 3.11 simulates the same for 32-byte data blocks. It is noticed that the 
probability approaches zero by 3 hash bytes for unidirectional errors, whereas 4 
hash bytes are required for symmetric errors. For 32 bytes data length, the non-
correctable error probability approaches zero by about 4 bytes hash-size for 
unidirectional errors and 5 bytes for symmetric errors. 
It is clear from Figures 3.10 and 3.11 that the unidirectional error model exhibits far 
fewer collisions, because the class of unidirectional errors is much smaller than that 
of symmetric errors. Finally, it is noticed from Figures 3.10 and 3.11 that MD5 and 
SHA-1 show comparable similar performance. 
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Figure 3.11: Probability of non-correctable errors for 32 data bytes [56] 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the numerical results for the search simulations in the 
different selected constellations. 
It is noticed from Table 3.3 that the computed error counts from equation (3.31) or 
(3.35) meets the simulation results of Table 3.3 with statistically non-significant 
differences. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of collision behavior for Unidirectional and Symmetric 
error models [56] 
Number of collision in Unidirectional and Symmetric Models 
Case 
Data = 16B , Hash = 1B Data = 16B , Hash = 2B 
# Error # Non-Correctable Errors(Collision) # Search Cycles # Error 
# Non-Correctable 
Errors(Collision) # Search Cycles 
1 373 296 151594 395 3 172524 
2 375 284 150112 402 2 170014 
3 4335 4335 18792225 4590 324 21068100 
4 4335 4335 18792225 4590 318 21068100 
Case 
Data = 16B , Hash = 3B Data = 16B , Hash = 4B 
# Error 
# Non Correctable 
Errors(Collision) 
#Search Cycles 
# 
Error 
# 
Non-Correctable 
Errors(Collision) 
#Search Cycles 
1 445 0 206450 469 0 230085 
2 429 0 188711 454 0 210008 
3 4845 2 23474025 5100 0 26010000 
4 4845 2 23474025 5100 0 26010000 
Case 
Data = 32B , Hash = 1B Data = 32B , Hash = 2B 
# 
Error 
# 
Non-Correctable 
Errors(Collision) 
#Search 
Cycles 
# 
Error 
# 
Non-Correctable 
Errors(Collision) 
#Search 
Cycles 
1 729 692 565031 754 9 606551 
2 724 685 576554 741 16 606680 
3 8415 8415 70812225 8670 1069 75168900 
4 8415 8415 70812225 8670 1130 75168900 
Case 
Data = 32B , Hash = 3B Data = 32B , Hash = 4B 
# 
Error 
# 
Non-Correctable 
Errors(Collision) 
#Search 
Cycles 
# 
Error 
# 
Non-Correctable 
Errors(Collision) 
#Search 
Cycles 
1 781 0 640639 797 0 671470 
2 769 1 653341 798 0 693701 
3 8925 4 79655625 9180 0 84272400 
4 8925 5 79655625 9180 2 84272400 
 
Case Type 
1 Unidirectional Model + Hash function(MD5) 
2 Unidirectional Model  + Hash function(SHA-1) 
3 Symmetric Model + Hash function(MD5) 
4 Symmetric Model + Hash function(SHA-1) 
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3.14 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF THE MISCORRECTION CASE 
The statistical analysis of the simulation results reveals that the miscorrection 
probability of the correction scheme is very small or unlikely to happen. As the 
number of hash bits HrE increases, the probability of a miscorrection decreases 
significantly in accordance with increasing the number of bits n in the time 
complexity 2n.  
In fact, the computed results indicate that the analytical relationship between 
increasing the number of bits in HrE and n indeed follows an exponential 
distribution form. As a consequence, the miscorrection probability of the correction 
scheme is equivalent to the preimage and second-preimage approach. 
Note that the proposed scheme adopts a one-way hash function of type MD5-128 
bits as a mechanism for error correction. Also, the simulation framework used in 
this study is based on the 2-bit and 3-bit message-digest approach rather than the 
classical method of 8-bit. The reason for this follows from the difficulty 
encountered in making an exhaustive search for the 8-bit message-digest approach.   
Figure 3.12 shows the probability of miscorrection of the correction scheme for 2-
bit and 3-bit data blocks. 
20 16 12 10 2 8 6 4 
 
(a) Data block of 2-bit type (Ds = 2 symbols) 
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20  16  12  10  8   6   4   2   
 
(b) Data block of 2-bit type (Ds = 3 symbols) 
21 18 15 12 9 6 3 
 
(c) Data block of 3-bit type (Ds = 2 symbols) 
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18 15 12 9 6 3 
 
(d) Data block of 3-bit type (Ds = 2 symbols) 
Figure 3.12: The probability of miscorrection of the correction scheme 
 
Table 3.4 shows the number of errors miscorrected of the error correction scheme 
for 2-bit and 3-bit data blocks respectively. 
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1 2 4 2 2 255 26 143 0.101960784
2 2 4 4 2 1023 134 192 0.130987292
3 2 4 6 2 4095 230 240 0.056166056
4 2 4 8 2 16383 302 288 0.018433742
5 2 4 10 2 65535 359 336 0.005477989
6 2 4 12 2 262143 408 384 0.001556402
7 2 4 14 2 1048575 453 432 0.000432015
8 2 4 16 2 4194303 498 480 0.000118732
9 2 4 18 2 16777215 543 528 3.23653E-05
10 2 4 20 2 67108863 588 576 8.76188E-06
11 2 4 22 2 268435455 633 624 2.35811E-06
12 2 4 24 2 1073741823 678 672 6.31437E-07
13 2 6 2 2 1023 42 767 0.041055718
14 2 6 4 2 4095 543 960 0.132600733
15 2 6 6 2 16383 1089 1152 0.066471342
16 2 6 8 2 65535 1431 1344 0.02183566
17 2 6 10 2 262143 1678 1536 0.006401086
18 2 6 12 2 1048575 1885 1728 0.001797678
19 2 6 14 2 4194303 2082 1920 0.000496388
20 2 6 16 2 16777215 2271 2112 0.000135362
21 2 6 18 2 67108863 2460 2304 3.66569E-05
22 2 6 20 2 268435455 2649 2496 9.86829E-06
23 2 6 22 2 1073741823 2838 2688 2.64309E-06  
(a) Data block of 2-bit type 
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1 3 6 3 3 4095 164 3135 0.04004884
2 3 6 6 3 32767 1587 3584 0.048432875
3 3 6 9 3 262143 2534 4032 0.00966648
4 3 6 12 3 2097151 3084 4480 0.001470566
5 3 6 15 3 16777215 3535 4928 0.000210702
6 3 6 18 3 134217727 3976 5376 2.96235E-05
7 3 6 21 3 1073741823 4417 5824 4.11365E-06
8 3 6 3 6 32767 241 3136 0.007354961
9 3 6 6 6 262143 1909 3584 0.007282285
10 3 6 9 6 2097151 2968 4032 0.001415253
11 3 6 12 6 16777215 3532 4480 0.000210524
12 3 6 15 6 134217727 3983 4928 2.96757E-05
13 3 6 18 6 1073741823 4424 5376 4.12017E-06  
(b) Data block of 3-bit type 
Table 3.4: Shows the number of errors miscorrected of the error correction scheme 
for 2-bit and 3-bit data blocks, respectively 
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COMBINED RS-CODE & HASH FUNCTION 
CORRECTION PERFORMANCE 
Error correcting codes (ECCs) are common techniques that have been used for 
many years for enhancing the reliability of the data transmission. They are 
embedded in numerous practical applications, such as storage systems, deep-space 
applications, satellite communications, etc. 
Error correcting codes are considered to be an appropriate method for memory 
systems where the integrity of the data written/read is significant, such as dynamic 
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random-access memory (DRAM) and NAND flash memories and, in particular, 
multi–level cell (MLC) architectures [64][65].  
Due to manufacturing issues, usage (wear and tear) and environmental factors, 
memory devices storing data may not retain their contents as expected. 
Implementing an ECC in hardware or software is a good way to restore or 
reconstruct missing data. Different ECCs algorithms have been adopted for both 
hardware and software in memory systems such as Hamming codes, Reed-Solomon 
(RS) codes, Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem codes (BCH), Hsiao codes, Reddy 
codes [66] [67][68]. 
However, in spite of the use of ECCs in memory systems, uncorrected errors are 
still present due to two factors. First, decoding failures occur, because the error 
correction capability of the decoder is limited to a certain number of errors [69]. 
Second, the memory manufacturers scale their memory devices down to smaller 
process technology units and store more bits per cell, which consequently degrades 
the reliability of the memory systems [70]. 
On the other hand, recently, security has become embedded and attached to data in 
vast memory system applications, especially when cryptography is used to protect a 
portion of memory against the replay attack [64].  
For instance, a secure hash algorithm (SHA) is implemented in the standard eMMC 
card with a digest size of 256 bits (32-byte).  This digest is used to authenticate the 
memory block area when the host needs to read/write access.  
In both cases, the memory card calculates the message authentication code (MAC) 
of the received (transmitted) data and compares it with the MAC sent (received) 
over by the host. If the MAC comparison is successful, then the write (read) request 
is considered as authenticated and correct.  
The reason for this calculation and diligence is to protect the memory block area 
from a replay attack, by ensuring that the response is coming from the card and not 
from an attacker. 
The availability of these two fields in newer memory systems opens new broad 
motivations to think about devising new approaches which will combine both 
coding and cryptographic fields in a complementary procedure designed to improve 
and expand the level of the reliability possible for such memory systems.  
The new proposed algorithm exploits existing cryptographic hash functions and 
ECCs in detecting and correcting additional errors in the memory system by 
combining a hard decision, best-effort decoding procedure by deploying the 
relatively powerful integrity and authenticity level of hash functions.  
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The proposed joint-ECC algorithm (assigned as, Triple byte error correction, 
Quadruple byte error detection or “TBEC_QBED”) offers the ability to correct up 
to three m-bit errors and detect up to four m-bit errors over Galois field GF(2m) with 
reasonable complexity. Where, m is the number of bits in each symbol or “Byte”. 
The modified decoding algorithm uses the “Double byte error correction (DBEC) 
Triple byte error detection (TBED) Reed-Solomon codes” [71] [72] as ECC 
algorithm, which has the ability to correct and detect errors at high speed, as a 
reference design anchor. The crypto-algorithm deployed involves MD5 
cryptographic hash functions. 
The results show that significant overall reliability improvement within a memory 
system is possible by using this joint decoding method in conjunction with a 
reasonably complex encoding and decoding algorithm. Notice that the procedure is 
just enhancing the system reliability without modifying the data format. It can be 
optionally activated without significant impact on the existing system architecture. 
4.1 STATE OF THE ART OF FAULT DETECTION AND 
CORRECTION TECHNIQUES  IN JOINT DECODING 
ALGORITHMS 
Cryptography and coding theory are thought to have common interests and 
relationships, since both of them sometimes use the same mathematical operations 
related to the Galois field (GF) and return different results in different architectures.  
Both of these fields were developed by Claude Shannon in his renowned work. In 
1948, Shannon developed an information theory in his famous article “A 
Mathematical Theory of Communication” during the Second World War and 
provided the next big step in understanding how much information could be reliably 
communicated through noisy channels [73].  
One year later, in October 1949, Shannon expanded on his information theory by 
publishing a new paper that proved the cipher “one-time pad” is unbreakable, 
assuming that the key which is used in the algorithm is truly random, as large as the 
plaintext, never reused in whole or in part and kept secret [73]. 
From that time forward, fewer works were devoted to investigating the relationship 
between the two fields, because their respective applications are quite different: 
cryptography is responsible for concealing information, and coding is responsible 
for revealing information. 
However, soft input decryption (SID) was an important and powerful error 
correction method introduced in 2006 [59]. The authors proposed at that time a new 
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method for improving error correction capabilities by combining two techniques: 
error correcting codes and cryptography. 
The joint field combined two different algorithms having two distinct, independent 
tasks: integrity and reliability. Both domains are of significant importance for 
guaranteeing an authentic and error-free message content. The first algorithm 
belongs to the class of forward error correction algorithms, and the second one is a 
type of cryptographic hash function.  
The joint algorithm proposed at that time included the decoder and decryptor was 
capable of correcting errors in case that, such errors occurred in the message digest 
and are limited in number. The idea of the proposed algorithm was based on simply 
taking the soft output of the channel decoder and using it as input to the decryptor. 
In general, the soft output of the decoder is given by the so called L-values (also 
called log-likelihood ratios LLRs). These L-values typically represent the reliability 
of an estimated value where high absolute L-values mean a high probability of bit 
correctness, and an L-value of 0 means a bit correctness probability of 0.5[59]. 
However, the strategy to correct the errors starts with the lowest order of the L-
values. As in the first case, a flip operation is performed for the first bit of the 
lowest L-values bits, and then a verification test is conducted to determine whether 
the message digest has been corrected or not. 
If the verification test indicates a valid repair message digest, then the decryptor has 
successfully corrected the error. Otherwise, the decryptor goes back to the flipping 
algorithm and tries with the next bit in successive order. Once the search procedure 
is completed, an estimate is considered to check if the error is corrected or not.  
The error correction ability is limited or dependent on the number of bits to be 
flipped; as the number of flipped bits increases, the possibility of correcting errors 
improves as well. The algorithm results show that this approach improves the 
transfer of a digital signature over a noisy channel. 
As is clear from the above description, the decryptor is considered to be not isolated 
from the decoder part; on the contrary, it is an integral part of the error correction 
mechanism, which integrates the decryption approach into the decoding process. 
In the years following this initial discovery, many papers were published dealing 
with this approach as a method for improving the reliability of data communication 
and data storage systems. Some of these papers were devoted to showing the 
advantages of combining a cryptographic cipher with channel coding while others 
were devoted to showing the advantages of combining cyclic redundancy checks 
and channel coding. But very few papers were introduced showing the relationship 
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between channel coding and cryptographic ciphers in mathematical operations [74] 
[75]. 
Fewer attempts have been made to investigate the advantages of combining 
channel coding and cryptographic hash functions. In what follows, we will 
introduce works related to combining channel coding and cryptographic hash 
functions. 
Cryptographic hash codes and convolutional/Reed-Solomon codes (channel 
coding), were combined together in order to improve decoding and decrypting 
results, are introduced in [36]. In this paper, two algorithms were proposed to 
improve the decoding results. In the first algorithm, the cryptographic hash function 
preceded the concatenated codes, while in the second algorithm the concatenated 
codes preceded the cryptographic hash function. The idea of the correction method 
for the first and second algorithms depends mainly on a soft decryption approach 
(SID) introduced in [59] as a technique for improving the coding gains in both 
algorithms.  
The encoding operation of the first algorithm is accomplished by concatenating the 
message digests with input data bits in one block and passing it through a 
systematic encoder which appends its redundancy bits at the end of the block. The 
entire block is then processed again by a convolutional encoder. Once the decoder 
detects an error in the block, an error correction procedure is applied.  
In the first algorithm, the convolutional decoder is applied to correct the errors 
through using the soft input decision (SISO) decoding method. After that, the soft 
output values from the convolutional decoder goes through the Reed-Solomon (RS) 
decoder, producing the data symbols concatenated with the message digests. If the 
consistency checking is approved between the message digest and the hash value of 
the data symbols, then the correction process has been performed successfully. 
Otherwise, if the decoder was not able to correct the errors, an SID approach is then 
taken into consideration for the soft output values. Once the soft output values are 
produced, a hard decision is made by the RS decoding algorithm. If the error is 
corrected, then an authenticity check is applied. If the authenticity is approved, then 
the data is corrected and authenticated. Otherwise, the SID method is repeated, but 
for the next set of L-values. If the RS decoding algorithm was not able to extract the 
original transmitted data, then the SID approach is applied again to the output of the 
RS decoding algorithm. Once the consistency checking is found between the hash 
value of the data and the signature of the message digest, the correction process is 
finished, otherwise, the SID operation is repeated for an additional data bit.  
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The second algorithm of the error correction method is based on calculating the 
redundant bits at first and then calculating the hash value for the entire block (data 
with redundant bits).  After that, the block goes through a convolutional encoder.  
The error correction method in this case is different from that used in the first 
algorithm, where the SISO decoding algorithm is executed first, then an authenticity 
check is introduced. If the authenticity check is approved, then the message is 
assumed authentic, otherwise an SID approach is used as a method for improving 
the error correction capability.  
The results show that the coding gain is improved with both algorithms. The first 
algorithm improves the channel decoding, and the second algorithm verifies and 
improves the results of the cryptography. 
The same work was done in paper [37], where the second algorithm is proposed, 
and the same procedure is used to improve the result of the cryptography and the 
coding gain. 
4.2 REED-SOLOMON ERROR CORRECTING CODES 
Reed-Solomon (RS) codes are an important group of error-correcting codes and 
were introduced by Irving S. Reed and Gustave Solomon in 1960 [76]. RS codes are 
powerful error correcting codes which are used in wide variety of applications, 
including, satellite communications, storage systems, wireless communications, 
mobile communications, high-speed modems, digital television CDs, DVDs, and 
digital subscriber lines. 
RS codes are linear block codes and a subset of the Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem 
Codes (BCH) [77] [78].  For this reason, RS codes belong to the family of block 
codes. RS codes are non-binary cyclic error correcting codes which are specified as 
RS (n, k, t) codes with k symbols as input and n symbols as output.  
In this notation, “n” is the block length in symbols (also called codeword); “k” is 
the number of information symbols in the message; and “t” means that the RS 
decoder is capable of correcting any combination of  t or fewer errors. Note that 
each symbol of the block k and n represents m-bits of information in GF(2m) 
The typical structure of the RS codeword is illustrated in Figure 4.1.  
In fact, RS codes have the largest possible minimum distance dmin among all linear 
codes with the same encoder input and output block lengths, which is given by [79]: 
)1.4(1min  knd  
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For this reason and as mentioned above, RS codes are capable of correcting any 
combination of t errors or fewer errors, where t can be defined as [79]: 
  )2.4(2/)1( min  dt  
Where,   a  represents the largest integer that does not exceeds a. 
 
Parity DATA 
k 2t 
n 
  
    
 
 Figure 4.1: The typical structure of the Reed-Solomon codeword [79]. 
 
Therefore, from equation (4.1) and (4.2), it is clear that the decoder has the ability to 
correct up to t symbols in a block of data having 2t symbols as a parity check: 
)3.4(2 knt   
However, the standardized RS decoding architecture is done by adopting three 
different levels to specify the corresponding error value and error location within 
the codeword frame. These steps are summarized as follows: 
1- Calculate the syndrome symbols from the received codeword. 
2- Compute the error locator polynomial. 
3- Find the error location and error values and then correct errors. 
Step number two, “computing the error locator polynomial” is the bottleneck of the 
RS decoder for high-speed decoding algorithms, especially in applications, such as 
memory system, which require high-speed data transformation. 
Many efforts have been devoted to reduce the complexity of the RS decoder and the 
time required for computing the error location. “Double Byte Error Correction 
(DBEC) Triple Byte Error Detection (TBED) Reed-Solomon codes” [71] is one of 
many codes which are very powerful in correcting both random and burst errors in 
memory systems. This code uses a very efficient method for calculating the error 
location without the need to compute the error locator polynomial, which in turn 
improves the speed of the decoding process and reduces memory requirements. 
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However, in spite of its efficiency in computing the error location, the algorithm has 
a limitation in that it can correct up to double byte errors and nothing more. As 
usual, forward error correction codes have a specific capability to detect and/or 
correct errors, and when that limited ability is exceeded, the corrected data might be 
miscorrected [80]. 
Expanding the capability of the error detection and/or correction may require some 
combination of increasing the parity check symbols, reducing the data symbols, and 
increasing the decoder complexity, but in the end, it may be impossible to achieve.  
Therefore, the combining the cryptographic hash functions and Reed-Solomon 
codes can offer an important advance to the state of the art. Having the same 
underlying structure facilitates the combining to improve the reliability and ability 
to detect and/or correct additional errors.  
The algorithm proposed in this thesis, “Triple m-bit error correction (TBEC) and 
Quadruple m-bit error detection (QBED)”, is an example of the efficiency of this 
combining of two fields, forward error correcting codes and cryptographic hash 
functions, into one single algorithm known as “RS_HF”. 
4.3 JOINT FECS  AND HF (RS_HF) 
The main goal of combining forward error correction codes “FECs” with hash 
function “HF” in this work is to improve the reliability of the error detection and 
correction process while maintaining a reasonable level of complexity for the 
decoding algorithm.  
In fact, combining is not trivial and may be complicated because different ways of 
thinking and new aspects requiring more effort to understand and evaluate in the 
context of combining and may threaten the quality of the resulting data. As the 
reliability level increases, the possibility of violating security constellation of the 
data content increases as well.  
However, the joint decoding algorithm proposed in this work includes two parts: the 
cryptographic hash functions (MD5) and the error control codes (Reed-Solomon 
code). The inner part Reed-Solomon code is responsible for the error handling while 
the outer part hash function is responsible for authenticating the correction process 
and thus retain reliability improvements.  
The main reason that the hash functions precedes the Reed-Solomon codes is that 
the decoding operation requires that corrupted data be corrected before using the 
cryptographic identification check to authenticate the validity of the data corrected. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the general structure of the error detection-correction algorithm 
for a combining method between the FECs and HF.     
Hash 
Functions
RS 
Encoder
Channel 
Error
Hash 
Functions
High-Speed
RS Decoder
Iterativ Evaluation
Feedback
 
Figure 4.2: The general structure of the error detection-correction algorithm 
 
4.4 ENCODER OF RS_HF ALGORITHM 
The RS_HF encoder is a function that maps data-hashes symbols of arbitrary 
length into a condensed digest of fixed length called redundant or parity check 
symbols. These symbols which are read from the encoder are separately added to 
the original data symbols to form an encoded data named as a codeword. 
The redundancy symbols are a simple or primitive/original form of the syndrome 
symbols, where the latter are used to determine the integrity of the decoded data 
produced by the decoding algorithm. It is well known that, the syndrome symbols 
give an accurate estimation of the error value and location and the number of errors 
that are generated in the received block. 
So, the calculation of the redundant symbols is necessary and allows us to 
understand if some errors have occurred, since zero value syndrome mean that the 
block data-hashes are correct and error free.  
In fact, the encoder, RS_HF, which is proposed in this work, is systematic because 
the input data-hash symbols are left unchanged (embedded into the codeword) and 
the parity symbols are appended to the end of the block codeword. This stands in 
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contrast to the non-systematic code where the output “codeword” does not contain 
the input data symbols. 
The data symbol-block k that forms the message to be encoded as one block can be 
represented as a polynomial k(x) of degree b-1, that is: 
)4.4(....)( 0
1
1
2
2
1
1 kxkxkxkxk
b
b
b
b 



  
Where each of the coefficients kb-1, kb-2… k1, k0: is an m-bit data symbol of   
GF(2m).  
The data symbols k(x) is given as an input to the encoder “RS_HF”, where different 
sequences of linear and non-linear operations are used to form the parity symbols. 
Note that the properties, linear and non-linear, and injectivity condition, guarantees 
that the decoding syndrome symbols are unique and mixed whenever it is possible. 
However, the encoder design in this work calculates the syndrome symbols in two 
steps.  
First, the hashing process, where the encoder computes the MD5 hash value h1 for 
the input data block k and returns it as a 32-digit hexadecimal number: 
)5.4(....)( 0
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Where each of the coefficients hv-1, hv-2… h1, h0 is an m-bit digest symbol and v is 
the number of m-bit symbols of the MD5 hash function. Note that any other 
cryptographic hash functions (for ex. SHA-1) can be used instead in our error 
detection-correction algorithm.  
Second, the redundancy calculation, where a part of the hash value h1 is 
concatenated/associated with the data symbols k to form a codeword of data-hash 
symbols known as “kh”.  
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Where ║:  means concatenated bit streams and b+v-1 is the number of data-hash 
symbols to be encoded. 
Once the concatenated bit streams kh is formed, the Reed-Solomon encoder takes 
the block kh as input and calculates five parity symbols as output.  
The calculation of the parity symbols for different size k and h symbols can easily 
be done by multiplying the block kh with the parity-check matrix Hc over GF(2m) as 
shown below [71]: 
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)7.4()( cs HkhxR   
Where Rs: is the “parity sent” symbol and Hc is the parity-check matrix which is 
defined as shown below [71]: 
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Where n is: the number of the codeword symbols, with n ≤ 2m – 1, and α is a 
primitive element in GF(2m). 
Now, after the redundant symbols are calculated from a block kh, these symbols are 
concatenated again with the frame kh and sent as part of the block khr.  
Figure 4.3 shows the encoder operation for the RS_HF algorithm. 
Note that the Reed-Solomon codes proposed in this work were originally capable of 
correcting two m-bit errors and detecting three m-bit errors.  The five redundant 
symbols mean, that the minimum distance bound dmin of the RS codes is six 
(equation 4.1). Hence, a block code with dmin = 6 can detect up to triple errors and 
correct up to double errors in any cod word. 
Therefore, the generator polynomial g(x) for dmin = 6 of the RS codes is given by 
[71]: 


 2
2
)9.4()()(
i
ixxg 
 
Where α is a primitive element in GF(2m). 
 
4.5 DECODING PROCESS OF THE RS_HF ALGORTIHM 
The codeword khr is transmitted (written), and because of the channel error, an 
error is expected to occur during the transmission process, which may affect the 
integrity of the khr structure.  Thus the need for a decoding operation is significant, 
as it enables us to check for errors, correct any of these errors within the capability 
of the decoder, and reassess the integrity of the data symbols after the ECC 
correction process is completed.  
Chapter Four 
 
101 
 
k Hash (k )
RS_Enc = Encoder (kh)
Redundancy (Rs)
k Rsh1
k h1
RS-ECC Codeword
 
Figure 4.3: RS_HF Encoder 
 
As usual, the first step in decoding a codeword is to compute the syndrome symbols 
Sr(x) over the given block khr'. For decoding anywhere from a single error up to 
triple errors and correcting the RS-HF code, the syndrome of 2t-tuple is defined by 
[71]: 
)10.4(')( Tcr HkhrxS 
 
Where Sr: is the “syndrome received” symbols, HCT: is the transpose of the 
parity-check matrix HC defined in equation 4.8 (section 4.4) and khr' is the 
codeword khr after transmission (may be corrupted with errors). 
In fact, the reliability of the error detection-correction algorithm proposed in this 
work is based mainly on the weight of the syndrome symbols as an indicator for the 
presence of errors in the block khr'. 
Once the syndromes symbols Sr(x) are generated the weight of the five syndromes 
are checked. 
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If the weight of the five syndrome symbols are of ‘zero’ value, then the content of 
the block khr' is intact and is considered as error-free. 
Otherwise, the weights of the syndrome symbols are non-zero and the decoder 
computes the syndrome Sr(x) as shown below [71]: 
)11.4(),,,,()( 21012 SSSSSxSr   
Note that the syndrome components (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5) are functions of the field 
elements over GF(2m) 
The presence of non-zero syndrome symbols indicates that the integrity of the block 
khr' is violated or altered somehow making the weight of the syndrome symbols not 
equal to zero value.  In this case, there is an error somewhere, and the block khr' 
needs to undergo an error correction process. 
The error correction algorithm proposed in this work consists of two parts. The first 
part is responsible for error handling for single and double error(s), and the second 
part is responsible for error handling of the triple error type. The first part corrects 
the error(s) directly using the double byte error correction triple byte error detection 
“DBEC_TBED” algorithm and authenticates the error(s) correction by using the 
digital signature of the hash function.  
Note that the process authentication check is optional. If the frame is expected to 
have fewer errors and the error correction code has a high level of robustness 
against miscorrection, process authentication check can optionally be omitted or 
executed. 
The second part corrects the errors using the triple byte error correction quadruple 
byte error detection “TBEC_QBED” algorithm. In this part, the use of 
authentication check is obligatory, as it improves the reliability of the error 
correction process. 
However, four cases of errors detection in the received block khr' are presented, 
which depend on the weight of the syndrome symbols Sr, the weight of the y-
parameters yr  (see Eq. 4.12 to 4.14) and the authenticity of the hash digest to 
specify the type of the error patterns in the block khr': 
1- If the weight of the syndrome symbols w (Sr) = 0, then there is no need for the 
error correction process in this case. The weight zero means that the block khr' 
is error-free, and the data bits are not modified.  
2- If the weight of the syndrome symbols w (Sr) = 5 and the weight of the y-
parameters are equal to w (yr) = 0, then a single error in the block khr' is 
detected and the need for a single m-bit error correction algorithm is necessary. 
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3- If the weight of the syndrome symbols w (Sr) = 5 or 4 or 3 and the weight of the 
gamma parameters are not equal to zero w (yr) ≠  0, then double errors in the 
block khr' are detected, and the need for double error correction algorithm is 
necessary. 
4- If the weight of the syndrome symbols w(Sr) = 1 or 2 or if the double error 
correction failed to correct double errors, then a triple (or more) byte error is 
detected in the block khr', and the need for the triple errors correction algorithm 
is established. 
4.5.1 Case No.1 (No errors) 
If the weights of the five syndrome symbols w (Sr) are ‘zero’, then the block 
khr' is assumed error free and the error correction process is not necessary.  
As mentioned earlier, if the frame is expected to have multiple errors, then the 
authenticity check is mandatory and important to perform. The reason for that is 
the undetectable error case which may arise in case that the block has multiple 
errors, exceeding the error detectability and correctability in the codeword khr'.  
4.5.2 Case No.2 (A Single Byte error) 
In this case, if the weight of the five syndrome symbols w (Sr) are nonzero, 
then the block khr' certainly contains an error, and it is necessary to calculate the 
y-parameters (y1, y3, y4) as defined below [71]: 
)12.4(11
2
01 SSSy   
)13.4(01213 SSSSy    
)14.4(12104  SSSSy  
As can be observed from the above equations, the calculation of the y-parameters 
are dependent on the syndrome values, so these values can be fed in parallel once 
they are calculated. 
However, if the y-parameters values are zero, a single error has been detected 
and the need for a single m-bit error correction “SBEC” algorithm is evident.  
The reason that y-parameters assume zero values is due to the characteristics of 
the linear block code, which are completely determined by its Hc matrix. So, to 
detect all single m-bit errors, the columns of the Hc matrix and the corresponding 
error syndromes should be unique. Therefore, the syndromes for a single m-bit 
error in the block khr' at the position i is the same as the i-th column of the Hc-
matrix multiplied by the error value ei such that: 
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Where ei is the error value, i is the error location, 0 ≤ i ≤ n-1, and α is a primitive 
element of GF(2m). 
So, for a single error, equations 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 deliver zero values, as the 
first and second terms in every equation has the same results, which make the y-
parameters value coincide with zero after performing the exclusive-or operation 
between these terms.  
The decoding procedure for single error correction is easily executed. From 
equation 4.15, the error value can be calculated simply through the third element 
of the syndrome symbols [71]: 
)16.4(0Sei   
    Where ei: is the error value and i is the error location, with 0 ≤ i ≤ n-1.  
Note that the third element of every column of the HC matrix is a unit element α0, 
and ei α0 = ei, with, 0 ≤ i ≤ n-1. Therefore, the error value ei is given directly by 
the third element of the syndrome symbols. 
Now, the problem of locating the error is reduced to finding a column of HC 
which satisfies equation 4.15. Therefore, the error location is calculated directly, 
without the need for computing the error locator polynomial, by dividing the 
value of the syndrome symbol by the error value ei (equation 4.16) for one of the 
following equation shown below [71]: 
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Note that the location of the error value is specified after computing the 
logarithm function for any primitive element α, such that: 
                  )21.4()( log iiLocation   
Once the error location is found, error correction is accomplished simply by an 
exclusive-or operation between the error value and the corresponding error 
symbol of the block khr' that is specified by it is location (equation 4.21). 
Recall that, if any of the y-parameters values are not zero, then the error in the 
block khr' is not a single-error as expected.  
4.5.3 Case No.3 (Double Byte errors) 
 As discussed in the previous section 4.5, if the weights of the syndrome 
symbols are 3 or 4 or 5 and the weight of the gamma parameters (y1, y3, y4) are 
not equal to zero, then the error is not a single and the need for the calculation of 
the gamma parameter y2 is indicated. The equation below shows the computation 
of the gamma parameter y2 as a function of syndrome symbols [71]: 
)22.4(20222 SSSy    
Now, if the weight of the y-parameters (y2, y3, y4) is a non-zero value, then the 
locations of the double errors are found but as roots of the following quadratic 
equation [71]: 
)23.4(
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Where αi and αj are the roots of the quadratic equation over GF(2m)  
for   0≤ i < j ≤ n-1,  
b and c are the coefficients of the quadratic equation defined below [71]: 
)25.4(02  cyby  
As is clear from the above discussion, it is important to have the weight of the y-
parameters (y2, y3, y4) assume a non-zero value as these parameters are 
responsible for locating the two errors in the received block khr'. 
Finding the roots of a polynomial over a finite field is important in algebraic 
coding theory because if the quadratic equation has a solution, this means that the 
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equation has two distinct roots (αi and αj), and the errors are double, otherwise it 
is not a double error and could potentially be a triple error or worse. 
However, once a solution for the quadratic equation is found, the correction 
process for double m-bit errors is performed directly by calculating the error 
locations i and j, and the error values ei and ej according to the equations defined 
below [71]: 
)26.4(222
j
j
i
i eeS

    
)27.4(1
j
j
i
i eeS

    
)28.4(0 ji eeS   
)29.4(1
j
j
i
i eeS    
)30.4(222
j
j
i
i eeS    
Where i and j are: the error locations, with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n-1.  
Once the error location is found, error correction is performed simply by exclusive-
oring the error value with the corresponding symbol of the block khr'. 
Figure 4.4 shows the correction process for single and double byte error(s). 
As mentioned in section 4.5, if the block khr' is expected to have multiple errors, 
then the authenticity check is mandatory and necessary to execute. The reason for 
that is the miscorrection error case, which may arise if the frame has multiple errors.  
There may be more errors in the frame than can be corrected, which could lead to 
violation of the data structure and produce unauthentic code.   
Thus, in this case, the authenticity check is a significant step in validating the 
correction process for single and double m-bit error(s). The authenticity checking is 
done by simply comparing the signature of the hash function with the hash value of 
the corrected data symbols. If the authenticity check is approved, then the data is 
corrected and authenticated. Otherwise it is unauthentic, and the data was corrected 
mistakenly. 
Note that there is still a low probability of having different data symbols in case of 
multiple errors leading authenticity approval. In this case, a miscorrection occurred, 
and the data was corrected mistakenly to a different code that can still be 
authenticated. However, later the results will show that this is a low percentage 
outcome that rarely happens, if ever. 
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Figure 4.4: SBEC_DBEC Decoder 
4.5.4 Case No.4 (Triple Byte Errors) 
Once the decoder has detected three or more errors in the block khr', the hash 
digest of the MD5 function and the weight of the syndrome and y-parameters are 
used to distinguish three or more m-bit errors. 
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In fact, the triple errors correction algorithm “TBEC” is mixed between two 
methods: exhaustive search with a hard-decision decoding method and a hard-
decision hashing method. 
Thus, a tentative hard-decision decoding is made after each search iteration to 
check whether all the “syndrome symbols” become zero valued or not. This 
process is repeated until the predefined maximum iteration number is reached or 
a legitimated codeword is found. 
Once the exhaustive search is completed, a verification decision is made based 
on the authenticity provided in the signature of the hash value. If the 
authentication decision results with a legitimate codeword, then the iterative 
decoding process has successfully corrected the triple errors. Otherwise, the 
codeword corrected mistakenly and produced an illegitimate codeword. 
Note that the error correction with this method may inevitably end up with a 
miscorrection case, but with low probability as the results show later.  
The error correction procedure starts by flipping one m-bit error-pattern inside 
each symbol (m-bit) of the block khr'. This is accomplished by embedding a new 
error-pattern ek into the block khr', such that: 
)31.4(kerkhrkh   
    Where ek: is the error-pattern proposed from GF(2m). 
If the errors inside the block khr' are really three errors, then the embedded error- 
pattern ek will correct one m-bit error of the three errors in the block khr'. 
Otherwise it is not possible to correct the errors, which means that there are 
quadruple errors or more. 
Note that after each flipping of an error-pattern in the block khr', the weights of 
the syndrome and the y-parameters are changed or updated. These new changes 
in the weights are used as a gradient function which will guide the exhaustive 
search toward the corrected codeword. 
Thus, the re-calculations for the syndrome and y-parameters values (y2, y3, y4) 
are relevant for checking if the weight of the syndrome symbols are 3, 4, or 5 and 
if the y-parameters do coincide with zero values or not (indicating double errors). 
If the weight of the syndrome and gamma symbols coincides with the values 
defined above, then the roots of the new quadratic equation are calculated again 
to correct the double byte errors. 
Once the error correction process is finished, authenticity checking begins. The 
reason for authenticity checking is to improve the error correction ability as well 
Chapter Four 
 
109 
 
as authenticating the error correction phase. The correction process is equivalent 
to an authentication attack on the content of the data structure.  
The authenticity checking is done as shown before in section 4.5.3 by using the 
hash value as an authenticity indicator. If there is consistency between the 
message digest h5 and the new hash value h6, then the errors are corrected and the 
data is assumed to be authentic. Otherwise the data symbols were corrected 
mistakenly and an additional error is embedded in the original block khr', which 
may increase the errors and make it unauthentic. 
This procedure is repeated until the predefined maximum iteration number of 
error-patterns is reached or a legitimated codeword is found. 
 
Once the correction process is finished, the decoder list is checked to see whether 
it contains three corrected errors or more.  In other words, if the correction 
process results finally with only three errors being corrected, then the errors are 
corrected successfully and the data is considered to be authentic. If the correction 
process resulted in more than a single instance of correcting three errors, then a 
collision case arises and the correction process is considered to be ambiguous, 
because the number of consistency checking or equalities between hash values is 
more than the threshold value specified to have authenticated corrected data. 
Recall that the authenticity check in the TBEC_QBED algorithm is obligatory, as 
mentioned in section 4.5, because the correction process involves modification of 
the data content, which may lead to decoding failure and a case of miscorrection. 
Figure 4.5 shows the TBEC_QBED decoder concept. 
 
The number of hash bits used as an error indicator in the error detection and/or 
correction algorithm is dependent on the length of the hash digest, the number of 
data symbols used, and the designed security level for the hash function to be 
collision-resistant. If the cryptographic hash function should offer a strong 
collision-resistance, then the need for hash bits in the error detection and/or 
correction algorithm is to be reduced.    
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Figure 4.5: TBEC_QBED Decoder 
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The decoding algorithm proposed in this section can be optimized for 
enumerative-search (exponential–time) complexity, through minimizing the 
number of search cycles by reducing the search space required to find just one of 
the triple errors.  
One approach to reduce the search space is to identify one of the three errors as a 
prior error and then terminate the search process, because the other errors (double 
errors), can be located and corrected directly by using the “DBEC_TBED” 
algorithm.  
As a corollary, this approach reduces the time (search) spent on reliability 
improvement and authenticity verification. The worst case for time complexity is 
to have triple errors located at the end of the block khr'. The total number of 
search cycles required for discovering any one of these errors is defined below: 
)32.4(VCSC ss   
Where V is the number of all possible non-zero symbols in GF(2m), and Cs is the 
total number of single-symbol error combinations hashed during the correction in 
a codeword having C-symbols [61]. In that case Cs is: 
!)1)2((!1
)!2(
)33.4(
1
2


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

 
C
C
C
Cs
  
2 C  
So, in that case the total number of search cycles is reduced by (2×V) search 
cycles, which improves the time required for locating errors.
 
4.6 ERROR CORRECTION PERFORMACE RESULTS 
The simulation results of combining the Reed-Solomon codes and MD5 hash 
function into a single algorithm used to correct up to triple byte errors on different 
values of data and hash digest are presented in this section. 
The simulation was performed using RS (15, 10, 2) codes, with the MD5 hash 
function as a model design reference. Different sizes of data block symbols of 4-bit 
are chosen, which are, 8, 6, and 4 symbols, respectively. The hash digest values are 
6, 4, and 2 symbols, respectively. Finally, the syndrome symbols are fixed to five 
symbols of 4-bit size for all of the above cases. 
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The results show that the error correction capability progressively changes from 
scheme to scheme, depending on the number of hash bits used to correct errors. As 
the number of hash bits increases, the probability of collisions and miscorrection 
diminishes while the probability of correcting errors improves. 
Figure 4.6 shows the relationship between increasing the number of hash digest bits 
and decreasing the probability of collisions for different data and hash digest sizes. 
The number of collisions is high when the hash value is equal to two symbols (2 × 
4-bits) because of the high value of the load factor (A > 1). Higher load factor 
values mean that the space overhead is decreasing, but with an associated increase 
in the number of colliding errors, as the number of input cases/errors exceeds the 
hash table size and are less than the size required to correct errors without collision 
cases.  
But, when the hash digest size increases to four symbols (4 × 4-bits), the number of 
colliding errors is less than the number of colliding errors with two hash digest 
symbols because the load factor became less than one, which offers a good tradeoff 
between the number of colliding errors and the size of the hash table.  
When the hash bits are increased to six symbols (6 × 4-bits), then the collision case 
becomes very infrequent because the number of hash digest symbols used is enough 
to resist colliding errors, and the hash table has too many empty array entries. This 
indicates that the minimum number of hash bits used to correct errors in our 
algorithm is 24 bits, which is consistent with the analytical results presented in 
Chapter Two “Error correction by crypto functions”. 
Note that the simulation was performed on a data, hash and syndrome symbols of 4-
bits rather than 8-bits. The reason for this choice is quite artistic, in that the number 
of search cycles required for covering all possible combinations of 8-bit errors is too 
large for exhaustive search and would require excessive processing time to derive 
the final results. 
An important point is that the number of colliding errors is measured or counted 
according to equation 3.27 (section 3.10) as the same approach used there is also 
employed in the combining algorithm to correct additional errors. 
For E= 2744 errors and using 16 hash bits, that is k=216, only C= 112.5 errors would 
probably collide out of 2744 entered items. For E=2744 and 24 hash bits, the 
expected number of collisions drops to C= 0.448 errors. Thus, using a hash value of 
more than 24 bits is expected to result in a negligible collision rate. The expected 
computational results agree with our experimental results as shown in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6: Probability of Collisions of the Joint Algorithm 
 
The same code used above for simulating the collision case is used here for 
determining the probability of miscorrection.  
The results show that the probability of miscorrection is decreasing, especially after 
the 24-bits hash value is used, and trending toward zero. This is due to two factors: 
the syndrome value and identification checks. First, after each iterative correction to 
the block codeword, the weights of the syndrome symbols are calculated again in 
order to check if they coincide with zero value or not. Second, identification checks 
are made after each successful correction process to authenticate the corrected 
codeword. 
Moreover, if more than 24 bits are used for the hash value, then the probability of 
miscorrection would tend to become around zero. From this discussion, it is clear 
that miscorrection happen very rarely when more than 24 hash bits are used. 
Figure 4.7 shows the relationship between increasing the number of hash bits and 
the probability of a miscorrection for different sizes of data symbols. 
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Figure 4.7: Probability of Miscorrection of the Joint Algorithm 
 
 
Note that the simulation results were run for random errors over all of the khr 
symbols (from 5 errors up to 15 errors) with 2,073,093,750 search cycles to get a 
good statistical estimate for each case.  
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COMMUTATIVE JOINT USAGE OF ECCS AND 
HASH FUNCTION FOR ERROR CORRECTION 
Hash function is a one-way cryptographic mapping which takes message of 
arbitrary length and produces a fixed length digest called “hash value” or simply 
“hashes” [81]. It is an irreversible function, meaning there is no inverse relationship 
between the original message and the output digest value. The output digest value 
created by a hash function has unique characteristics or features which enable the 
recipient to detect message-tampering with a very high degree of confidence. 
Hash functions play fundamental tasks in modern cryptography. Different types of 
hashing algorithms featuring different security properties [82]. Hashing is relevant 
for virtually all cryptographic applications, such as message integrity checks, digital 
signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and various information security 
applications [83]. 
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Cryptographic hash functions provide a very high level of authenticity and integrity 
in security applications, however basically are not responsible for reliability tasks. 
In fact, hash functions are dedicated to security applications and, not to improving 
reliability. Thus, if the hash digest is corrupted with errors for some reason, the hash 
function cannot identify the source of the detected inconsistency even if the hashed 
data are intact and error-free.  
Such a problem arises in applications which have no reliability support at the 
authentication level. Such cases result with irreversible system failure which can be 
possibly avoided with no significant loss of authenticity.  Our proposed approach is 
to replace a part of the hash bits by ECC bits without changing the information 
template of the existing application. The inserted ECC bits can serve to correct 
errors in both data and hash regions. 
Of course correcting a number of errors in the hash digest or the data means that the 
authenticity and integrity check from cryptographic point of view is degraded by the 
number of bits abused (stolen) for the new ECC task. As a result, the overall system 
becomes basically more vulnerable to authentication attacks. However, 
vulnerability to attack is less likely if the number of corrected errors is kept as small 
as possible and the share of inserted ECC bits is kept small. This is practically 
realizable in most today’s systems as the standardized hash mappings often exceed 
in their bit size (possibly 256 or 512 bits) the application’s security requirements. A 
commutative trustable relationship between the hash digest authentication process 
and error correction mechanism has to be established in a tamperproof system 
environment. 
In this chapter, a new technique is introduced as sample model to correct single and 
double errors in the data and hash digest. The new technique is based on combining 
hash functions and error correcting codes (ECCs) as mechanisms to improve the 
reliability of the cryptographic hash functions. This technique is called improved 
reliability in the message digest using joint forward error correction codes and hash 
functions. 
Improved reliability in the message digest using joint FEC codes and hash functions 
is another technique worth considering proposed in this section to improve the 
robustness and reliability of the error correction codes beyond the minimum 
distance bound. One added benefit of this technique is ensuring the reliability of the 
hash digest block.  
Many methods have been proposed to increase the reliability of the decoding results 
beyond the minimum distance bound [84] [85] [86] [87], but here a different 
approach is proposed and investigated that involves the use of both a fast syndrome 
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decoding and hash digest symbols commutatively as contributing factors to this 
improvement process. 
Procedural Differentiation from the Technique Proposed in Chapter 4: 
In the previous chapter (Chapter 4), the proposed error detection-correction 
algorithm was based on ECCs preceding the hash function to detect and correct 
errors. Also, the redundant symbols were calculated for the whole block (message 
and hash digest blocks). In difference to that in this chapter’s approach, calculating 
the hash digest and redundant symbols proceed in independent ways, such that 
neither one owns the other. 
Beyond that, the redundant symbols were calculated according to a double 
interleaving ECC scheme between the odd and even data indices. This operation is 
of significant interest in distributing errors through the data symbols, which 
provides a high-speed, low complexity error correction method against burst errors 
[88]. 
Special Features of the Proposed Procedure: 
The error detection/correction procedure with the algorithms proposed in this 
chapter has several particular features. 
First, the major advantage of the joint algorithm is that it does not increase the 
bandwidth of the channel or its pass-through capacity. This is because the redundant 
check symbols, which are calculated using the interleaved data, are embedded into 
the digest block and sent replacing a dropped part of the message digest, but at the 
expense of reducing the authenticity level.  
Modern hash digests are often over-dimensioned and large for security purposes. 
Therefore some of the excess bits can be removed and utilized to accommodate the 
redundant bits without compromising the hash digest’s function significantly (just 4 
bytes).  Of course system collision resistance will be reduced as a side effect, but 
with a very low likelihood of occurrence, especially if the number of removed hash 
bits is very small (say 32 bits) compared to the original hash digest size (say 512 
bits). 
Second, the structure of the hash function has not been changed; we have simply 
removed a small number of digest bits from the output and embedded redundant 
symbols instead. The redundant symbols are to be used later in the error detection 
and correction process, with the possibility of restoring the original hash value 
completely as required on the received side. The solution can be overlaid optionally 
in existing systems!. 
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Third, this joint ECC-Hash effort lets the hash function act to improve its own 
integrity and fault tolerance interactively with the overlaid ECC technique.  At the 
same time preserves its authenticity property with minor loss as would be 
demonstrated later.  
Fourth, this algorithm can be adopted optionally in existing systems for many 
applications where the hash functions are available just for security tasks. 
5.1 IMPROVED SYSTEM RELIABILITY BY  USING JOINT FEC 
CODES AND HASH FUNCTIONS  
The joint algorithm proposed in this section originates from using two codes: the 
forwarded error correction codes and the hash function supporting properties. 
Both of these correction and check mechanisms are different in structure and output 
length and serve different tasks and purposes. However, in spite of this divergence 
and difference, it is possible to manipulate the contents of each code in order to find 
a consistent relationship between them. This interactive relationship provides error 
correction capability in both of the blocks, the hash digest block and the data block, 
which is (to our knowledge) new in the public literature. 
The encoder block of the joint algorithm includes two different mapping functions, 
the first one is the interleaver and the second one is the hash function. 
Figure 5.1 shows the general structure of the combining algorithm between the 
forward error correction codes and the hash functions. 
The input data block (D), which is fed as an input to the interleaver, is divided into 
two blocks (Do and De) having different indices: odd and even. Each of these blocks 
is passed through an interleaver mapping function to generate two different 
redundant bits of information know as parity odd symbols (Ro1, Ro2) and parity even 
symbols (Re1, Re2). 
Each pair of the parity symbols is responsible for error detection and correction 
related to the same data block indices. 
However, the encoder block generates at the same time, without affecting the 
interleaved calculations, the hash digest (H) after hashing the whole data block (D) 
for secrecy tasks. Once the hash digest and redundant symbols are calculated, an 
elimination operation is performed, which removes a part of the hash digest output 
value and replaces it with the redundancy check symbols instead. 
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Figure 5.1: The general structure of the combining algorithm between the 
forward error correction codes and the hash functions. 
These symbols, in conjunction with the remaining hashing symbols derived 
separately from the same data block (D) are used mutually in a synchronous way to 
determine the type of error detected and the type of error correction process 
required.  
Once the data, the hash digest, and the redundant symbols are received, an error 
detecting operation is performed to verify if the data and the hash digest blocks 
have been received correctly or not.  
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The detection operation includes two different types of calculations: the syndrome 
calculation (Sr) and the re-hashing calculation. 
The syndrome calculation is carried out by again dividing the received data blocks 
into two blocks (Do' and De') and passing them to the interleaver. Two different 
pairs of syndrome symbols are generated. Each pair of these symbols is responsible 
for finding an error location and error value related to the same data block indices. 
At the same time, a rehashing operation is performed on entire data block (D) to 
generate the hash block (H"). After the new calculations are completed, the weights 
of the syndrome symbols and the discrepancy between the hashes are checked in 
order to discover whether an error has occurred.  
If the weight of the syndrome symbols calculated is of zero value and the 
discrepancy between the received signature (H') and the new hash digest (H") is 
zero, then the data is considered to be error-free and authentic, otherwise the 
decoder starts the decoding process and tries to correct errors using the information 
provided by the syndrome and digest symbols. 
5.2 ENCODING PROCESS FOR THE INTERLEAVING-HASHING 
ALGORITHM 
As mentioned in the previous section, the interleaving-hashing encoder proposed 
in this work is a simple combination of basic building blocks: an error correction 
encoder block and a hash function block. Both of these blocks are executed in 
parallel, since they share the same data source, but in an independent way, 
producing two different redundancy versions of information know as parity check 
symbols and hash digest, respectively. 
The first part, parity check symbols, is computed by the interleaver block for two 
different input data blocks (Do, De) as shown below according to the procedure 
shown in [89]: 
)1.5(1  ioo DR  
  )2.5()(mod2 xgDxxR ioioo   
)3.5(1  iee DR  
  )4.5()(mod2 xgDxxR ieiee   
Where Dio and Die are the input data blocks corresponding to odd and even indices, 
respectively; Ro1, Ro2, Re1, and Re2, are the odd parity symbols and the even parity 
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symbols corresponding to the input odd and even data blocks, respectively; and g(x) 
is a primitive polynomial. 
The odd parity symbols (Ro1, Ro2) are responsible for detecting and correcting the 
presence of errors in the odd data block, and the even parity symbols (Re1, Re2) are 
responsible for detecting and correcting the presence of errors in the even data 
block.  
Similarly, and at the same time, the hashing process is applied to the entire input 
data block (Doi and Die), mapping it into a shortened version of the hash digest 
known as the hash value (H). The generation of the collision-resistant digest is 
performed according to the function below:   
H = Hash (D)                                                                            
Where D is the input data block containing the interleaving data between the odd 
and even symbols, and H is the hash value, which is generated after hashing the data 
symbols D using the hash function MD5 or any other standard hash function. MD5 
function is adopted for our model as a worst-case hash function example.  
Figure 5.2 shows the operation for data encoding and error-detection method for the 
interleaving-hashing algorithm. 
Again, after the hash digest and the parity check symbols are generated, an 
elimination operation follows. This operation is responsible for removing a limited 
number of hash bits and ECC parity check bits instead. This operation reduces the 
strength of the hash function in terms of collision resistance and attack complexity, 
but to an acceptable level if the number of hash bits removed is small.  
Finally, a concatenation operation is performed to concatenate the three blocks 
(data, hash digest, and redundant check bits) into a single block assigned as DHR. 
 
5.3 DECODING PROCESS FOR THE DEINTERLEAVING-
REHASHING ALGORITHM 
Once the error detector receives the block DHR, the detector starts to parse the 
incoming data to detect if an error has occurred or not. 
Referring to Fig. 5.2, the error detection method proposed in this section uses the 
weight of the syndrome symbols and the discrepancy between the hash digests 
received to decide whether the data block is error-free or has a single error, double 
errors, or more. 
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Figure 5.2: Data encoding and error-detection method for the interleaving-
hashing algorithm 
If the weight of the syndrome symbols is zero and the hash discrepancy results with 
zero, the data is considered to be error-free and authentic. 
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Otherwise, the calculations of the syndrome symbols proceed to specify the type of 
errors occurring in the data block DHR [89]: 
)5.5('' 111   oiooo SERRDRS  
  )6.5()(mod)'(' 222 xgSERRDxxRxS oioiooo    
)7.5('' 111 eieee SERRDRS    
  )8.5()(mod)'(' 222 xgSERRDxxRxS eieieee    
Where Dio' and Die' are the input odd and even data blocks, respectively; So1, So2, 
Se1, and Se2, are the odd and even syndrome symbols, respectively; SERRo1, 
SERRo2, SERRe1, and SERRe2, are the errors affecting So1, So2, Se1, and Se2, 
respectively; and g(x) is a primitive polynomial. 
Once the syndrome symbols are calculated for odd and even blocks and the hash 
digests are compared, the error type is detected or considered.  
Error Correction and Decoding Procedure: 
Four cases are considered and summarized in the corresponding error correction 
algorithm. 
First case, if the weight of the syndrome symbols (So1, So2, Se1, Se2) assume zero 
values and if the discrepancy between the two hashes are one or two symbols, then 
the data is considered to be error-free, and the hash digest symbols contain with 
certainty single or double errors. Since the zero value for the syndrome symbols 
indicates that no errors are detected within the data block D', the possibility of 
having an error in the hash digest symbols increase due to the discrepancy 
difference between the two hash digests values. 
Note that the discrepancy between the hash digests is calculated according to the 
equation below: 
HH
HDHashyDiscrepanc

 )9.5()(
 
Where D' is the received data block symbols (possibly corrupted with some errors) 
containing the interleaving data between the odd and even symbols, respectively, H' 
is the received hash digest (may be corrupted with some errors), and H" is the 
rehashing digest for the data block D'. 
So, the correction process in this case is simple and is based on replacing the 
corrupted symbols in the digest H' with the corrected ones from the digest H".   
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In the second case, a single or double error(s) occurs in the syndrome symbols, with 
the possibility of having a single error in one of the syndrome symbols and the 
others in the hash digest symbols. In this case, the data block is assumed to be error-
free, and the proof will be through the hash digest discrepancy and not the 
syndrome symbols themselves.  
The reason for that is the error correction process, which is applied to the errors in 
the data block and is not capable of correcting the errors inside the syndrome block. 
However, if the discrepancy check between the two digests (H' and H") is of 0 or 1 
error, then the data is assumed to be errors-free and the error is in the syndrome 
symbols.   
The correction process for the case that the hash digest has a single error is the same 
as above, which is to replace the corrupted symbol in the digest H' with the 
corrected one from the digest H".   
Note that for the two cases above, if the discrepancy check between the two 
messages digests discovered that the corrected message digest is invalid then there 
was a possibility to have a double or more errors, and the solution will be through 
applying the flipping approach as seen in the case number four. 
 Third case, if the weight of the syndrome symbols is not equal to zero and the 
discrepancy also is not equal to zero, then the error either is single or double or 
worse. 
If the weights of the syndrome symbols are of the type below, then the error is 
either single in the odd or even data block, or double, but with a single error in each 
data block separately.  
if
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1≠0, Se2≠0
if
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1≠0, Se2=0
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se2≠0, Se1=0
So1≠0, Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So2=0
So2≠0, Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So1=0
if
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1= Se2=0
Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So1= So2=0
Double Errors in:
Dio' and Die' blocks 
Double Errors:
Either in: Dio ' and Re' blocks
Or in: Die ' and Ro' blocks 
Either Single Error: 
in : Dio' block
Or in: Die' block
Or Double Errors
in: Dio' and H' blocks
Or in: Die' and H' blocks  
Note that there is a possibility to have a single error in the hash digest symbols and 
the other errors in one of the data blocks symbols (odd or even). 
However, the single error correction code is used in this case to correct a single 
error in the data block. 
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Once the correction process is finished, two different checks are performed. 
The first one is the reliability check, which is responsible for proving whether the 
weight of the syndrome symbols after the completion of the correction process 
assumes zero value or not. If the weight of syndrome symbols holds a value of zero 
or one, then the error is considered to have been corrected. Otherwise, the block 
DHR contains either double errors in the same data and redundant blocks (odd or 
even block) or it has more than double errors, and the solution will be by applying 
the flipping approach as seen in the case number four. 
The second one is the authenticity check, which is done through a discrepancy 
check between the new hash digest and the original signature, so as to authenticate 
the corrected data symbols (D"new). 
If the discrepancy resulted in a zero or single error, then the corrected data is 
assumed to be authentic, otherwise it was corrected mistakenly, and the discrepancy 
check discovered that the corrected data is invalid and contains more than double 
errors. 
Note that the correction process for the case where the hash digest has a single error 
is performed by replacing the corrupted symbol in the digest H' with the corrected 
one from the new digest H"new.   
Fourth case, otherwise, if the weight of the syndrome is of the type shown below, 
then the data block (odd or even) has double errors, and the error correction using 
the interleaved method does not support an error correction for double errors in the 
same data block. Therefore, a flipped method is the best solution for this case. 
 
if
So2= Se1= Se2=0, So1≠0
So1= Se1= Se2=0, So2≠0
So1= So2= Se2=0, Se1≠0
So1= So2= Se1=0, Se2≠0
if
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1= Se2=0
Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So1= So2=0
Double Errors:
Either in: Dio' block
Or in: Die' block
Or in: Dio' and Ro' blocks
Or in: Die' and Re' blocks 
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Error Correction Beyond the ECC capability: 
In fact, the interleaved method corrects the data symbol errors in a separate 
block, but when the block itself has more than a single error, it is impossible to 
correct the errors. 
To address this limitation of the error correction code, the flipping approach can be 
adopted (the same method used in Chapters 3 and Chapter 4). 
An exhaustive search method is applied, where all possible combinations of errors 
ek are used to find the location of one of the two errors and attempt correcting it. 
An exclusive-or operation is performed in each search cycle between the data-
redundant block (DR) and the inserted proposed error pattern for correction ek, as 
shown below: 
)10.5(keDRDR   
As the name implies, exhaustive search means that the search algorithm tries every 
possible combination of proposed errors until it finds the right error correction. 
If the errors are actually double errors, then the flipping method will correct 
(hopefully) one of the two errors, and the single error correction algorithm will 
correct the other errors. 
After each correction process, an authentication check is performed on the corrected 
data block by examining the discrepancy difference between the signature and the 
new hash digest. 
If the discrepancy checking results in zero value, then the data is assumed to be 
correct and authentic, otherwise the algorithm moves to the next error ek+1. 
Once the search cycle for the error correction process is completed, an estimation of 
the number of errors corrected in the data block is considered.  
Three cases will be the result after the error correction procedure is completed: 
Case1: If the number of corrected errors inside the error list is two, then the data-
hash is assumed to be correct and error-free, and the error correction 
process is assumed to have completed successfully, producing authentic 
data-hash block. 
Case2: If the number of corrected errors inside the error list is more than two, then 
the correction process is assumed to be ambiguous, and the collision case 
arises, because the number of corrected errors is more than the expected 
threshold value of two errors.   
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Case 3: If the number of corrected errors inside the error list is less than two, then 
the correction process cannot correct the errors because there is more than a 
double error. Figure 5.3 shows the decoder algorithm for single and double 
errors. 
Try to correct
If
So1≠0, Se1≠0, So2=Se2=0
So1≠0, Se2≠0, So2=Se1=0
So2≠0, Se1≠0, So1=Se2=0
So2≠0, Se2≠0, So1=Se1=0
or
So2=Se1=Se2=0, So1≠0
So1=Se1=Se2=0, So2≠0
So1=So2=Se2=0, Se1≠0
So1=So2=Se1=0, Se2≠0
or
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1=Se2=0
Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So1=So2=0
If
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1≠0, Se2≠0
or
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1≠0, Se2=0
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se2≠0, Se1=0
So1≠0, Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So2=0
So2≠0, Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So1=0
or
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1=Se2=0
Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So1=So2=0
If
So2=Se1=Se2=0, So1≠0
So1=Se1=Se2=0, So2≠0
So1=So2=Se2=0, Se1≠0
So1=So2=Se1=0, Se2≠0
or
So1≠0, So2≠0, Se1=Se2=0
Se1≠0, Se2≠0, So1=So2=0
Data is error-free 
and authentic, 
Error in Redundant
End
Discrepancy = H"  H'
= 0                              = 1
Data is error-free 
Error in hash H' 
and Redundant 
End
Replace error digest 
with the corrected one 
from the H" digest
Discrepancy = H"  H'  ≠ 0
Yes
No
Single byte error correction 
Algorithm
Calculate Sr': So1',So2',Se1',Se2'
Calculate H"new = Hash (D"new)
W(Sr')
= 0 or 1
Data is corrected 
and authentic
End
Discrepancy = H"new  H'
= 0                              = 1
Data is corrected 
Error in hash H'
End
Replace error digest 
with the corrected one 
from the H"new digest
Discrepancy = H"  H'  ≠ 0
Yes
No
Single error correction 
Algorithm
Calculate Sr': So1',So2',Se1',Se2'
Calculate H"new = Hash (D"new)
W(Sr')= 0 or 1
Discrepancy = 0
Flipping method
DR = DR  ek
Data is assumed 
to be corrected 
adequately and 
authentic
If  > 2 , 
entries 
in error list
If = 2 , 
entries 
in error list
If <  2, entries
in error list
Errors 
> 2
Collision !
End
All errors flipped
and cheked
Enter Error in the 
error propsal list
No
Yes
  
Figure 5.3: The decoding algorithm for a single and double error 
In fact, the error correction approaches for the third and the fourth case are 
dependent on an interchangeable confidence trade-off process between the hard 
decision (ECC correction based on the weight of the syndrome symbols) and 
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authenticity decision (based on the discrepancy between the two hash digests) to 
produce accurate and authentic corrected data symbols at the same time. Therefore, 
the miscorrection case is considered to be very rare as both hashing and ECC 
performance are combined together. 
Note that the fourth case above is taken into consideration only after calculating and 
considering all of the cases for single and double errors which may occur in the 
data, message digest, and redundant blocks, respectively.  
5.4 EXPERIMENTAL ERROR CORRECTABILITY FOR RELIABLE 
HASH FUNCTIONS ALGORITHM 
The experimental error correction results for different hash digest bits are 
introduced in this section. The results showed that the proposed algorithm has the 
ability to correct single and double byte errors if they occurred in the data and 
hashes blocks. 
The number of colliding errors resulting from using partial bits of the hash digest 
and error correction codes is shown in figure 5.4. The curves clearly show that the 
numbers of colliding errors decrease as a natural result of increasing the number of 
hash digest bits.  
The number of colliding errors is high when the message digest value is equal to 
two symbols (2 × 8-bits) because of the high load factor value. Higher load factor 
values mean that the space overhead is decreasing, but with an associated increase 
in the number of colliding errors, as the number of input errors exceed the hash 
table size and are less than the size required to correct errors without collision cases.  
However, when the hash digest size increases to three symbols (3 × 8-bits), the 
number of colliding errors is less than the number of colliding errors when there are 
two hash digest symbols, specifically because the load factor has become less, 
which offers a good tradeoff between the number of colliding errors and the size of 
the hash table.  
When the hash bits are increased to four symbols (4 × 8-bits), then the collision case 
becomes very infrequent because the number of hash digest symbols used is enough 
to resist colliding errors, and the hash table has too many empty array entries. This 
indicates that the minimum number of hash bits used to correct errors in our 
algorithm is 24 bits, which is consistent with the early analytical results presented in 
[56]. 
Note that the simulation was performed using single-error-correcting RS codes, 
with the MD5 hash function as a model design reference. Different 8-bits data block 
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symbols sizes are chosen. The message digest values are 2, 3, and 4 symbols, 
respectively. Finally, the syndrome symbols are fixed to four symbols of 8-bit size 
for all of the above cases. 
Another finding worth mentioning is that the probability of collision increases as 
the data length increases, but with the immutability of the message digests length. 
This is due to the number of search cycles used for error correction, which also 
increases.    
Note that the results of the miscorrected errors are still under processing, and more 
experiments are required before giving the final conclusions.   
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Figure 5.4: Probability of colliding errors for different data and hash symbols. 
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CONCLUSION 
6.1 CONCLUSION ON FAULT CORRECTION IN AES EXCEUTION 
The major advantage of the proposed fault detection and correction technique for 
AES cipher is the resulting high coverage and high error correction capability 
reached. The particular advantage is that the technique is deploying the cipher own 
ShiftRows and MixColumn linear mappings without additional error correction 
scheme. The algorithm proposed is also merging both transformations covering both 
transformations in one step. The maximum distance separable MDS properties of 
the MixColumn matrix were deployed for a linear error correction mapping. 
 
The parity check matrices, generated by using linear operations for error detection-
correction process, are constructed from the maximum distance separable matrix. 
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The proposed algorithm does not need further to change the order of 
transformations in order to achieve fault detection and correction as proposed in 
other approaches.  The temporally stored redundancy checks for ECC functionality 
served to correct a relatively large number of errors, the resulting syndrome 
generation and error correction operation is relatively complex resulting with large 
non-linear decoding mappings. The attained overhead of 126% in gate complexity 
seems a bit high however no attempts have been done towards optimizing the gate 
complexity of the whole concept. A possible future work could investigate further 
decoding complexity reduction and optimizations toward better gate complexity 
figures. 
 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS ON IMPROVING RELIABITY BY DEPLOYING 
CRYPTO-FUNCTIONS 
The proposed approaches to improve system reliability by deploying highly non-
linear pseudo-random crypto functions have been proposed in different 
constellations in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.   
The first approach is deploying pure cryptographic hash functions to improve 
system reliability without any traditional error control coding. The results seem very 
promising when used for small class of errors as in the case of unidirectional errors 
in aging units. Applications in Smart cards and hand-held devices are good 
candidate use-cases.  The time complexity of the procedure is relatively high as the 
whole system is based on successive check playing the whole selected error class. 
However the time complexity offered is a very good best effort system remedy for 
many applications in low cost mass products. Or even in hopeless damage cases 
where best-effort retrieval is necessary to salvage a destroyed system even partially 
and even if it would take a very long time.  
Further future fine-tuning of the deployed techniques seems to be possible by 
reducing the decoding search time by possible other error classifications or by 
radically reducing the processing time of a hash matching without completing all 
bits as a binary decision of Yes or No is required in most cases. A trade-off by pre-
computations using huge look-up memory resources could play a speed-up role for 
the whole procedure similar to the techniques used in cryptanalysis attacks. 
Experimental simulation results showed that even simple (possibly out of date) hash 
function such as MD5 and SHA1 (less than 256 bits) exhibited efficient error 
correction performance. Deploying modern hash functions with large message 
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digest (256 to 1024 bits) for authentication in modern applications is expected to 
achieve high immunity against errors in many applications. 
The second constellation proposes new hard-decision combined ECC and 
cryptographic function as a possible solution for improving system reliability 
beyond the classical minimum distance bound. The new algorithms proposed in 
chapter 4 and chapter 5. The technique is similar to the list decoding technique 
(introduced first by Elias in the late 50s) allowing decoding (not uniquely) beyond 
the half-distance barrier using the classical Hamming distance concept. The 
proposed technique allows actually selecting the error class to be corrected without 
any bound discarding all Hamming distance considerations.  
An additional error is corrected through successive probing until the hash digests 
matches with reasonable complexity if the selected error class is small enough. The 
experimental algorithm proposed showed by simulation interesting results which 
agreed with our statistical evaluations when assuming that out crypto-functions are 
equivalent to classical pseudorandom functions. Error correction capability was 
increased by correcting one additional byte but not all possible errors of that class, 
however covering a practically significant number of them.  
Using a part of hash digest for error correction could reduce the strength of the 
cryptographic hash function in terms of collision and attacking security level. 
However, the system is scalable to attain always non-significant degradation for the 
overall system security performance. The attained confidence level in the correction 
process was experimentally quite good and statistically predictable. Our 
experimental methods deployed byte-oriented RS codes over GF(2m) having m-bits 
per symbol. Our target systems were dedicated for computer environment exhibiting 
often m-adjacent error behavior within word limits. 
In chapter 5 an ECC technique substituting part of the hash-digest is proposed. In 
that case no need to increase the bandwidth of the channel and its pass-through 
capacity. Since the redundant symbols which are generated using ECC are 
embedded into the hash digest symbols instead. The new technique showed 
interesting ability to enhance remarkably the system reliability with relatively low 
time complexity overhead. 
Future research in that subject area could address the general case of selecting error 
classes to be corrected by practical system training/statistics and constructing 
sophisticated error correction mechanisms apart from the classical linear coding 
theory and its channel assumptions techniques. Improving the decoding time 
performance is one very interesting research issue for practical application having 
special computational and memory resource capacity.  
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PUBLICATIONS 
This appendix lists the publication of the author related to this thesis. 
 
The author submitted 4 papers.  
One of these papers was reviewed and accepted in the IEEE international 
conference ICC 2013, “Workshop on Information Security over Noisy and Lossy 
Communication Systems”.  
 
(1) M. Ayoob and W. Adi, “Unidirectional Error Correction by Crypto 
Functions,” IEEE International Conference ICC 2013, Workshop on 
Information Security over Noisy and Lossy Communication Systems”.      
ICC 2013, June 2013, Budapest. 
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This paper discusses and investigates the error correctability of some hash 
functions used for authentication in correct symmetric and, particularly, 
unidirectional errors. It demonstrates the ability to correct single byte error 
deploying highly nonlinear pseudorandom hash function. The results of this 
work were incorporated into Sections 3.13 and 3.14 in extended form, 
respectively. 
 
(2) M. Ayoob and W. Adi, “Fault Detection and Correction in Processing 
AES Encryption Algorithm”.  
 
Submitted to: International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies 
(EST-2015)  
An algorithm to detect and correct execution errors in Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) transformations is presented in this paper. The new 
algorithm makes use of the linear operations of AES to detect errors in the 
ShiftRow (SR) and MixColumn (MC) transformations. The error correction 
is achieved by creating redundant check words through a linear mapping to 
create in error case an error syndrome with minor additional complexity. The 
algorithm proves the ability to ensure the reliability and security of a 
cryptosystem against the execution errors. The contents are extracted 
partially from sections 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. 
 
(3)  M. Ayoob and W. Adi, “Improving System Reliability by Partial Usage 
of Hash Function Bits for Error Correction”.  
 
Submitted to: International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies 
(EST-2015)  
 
This paper presents an algorithm to improve system reliability by combining 
simple interleaved Reed-Solomon codes and cryptographic hash functions 
into a single block. The error correction approach used in this paper is 
dependent on an interchangeable confidence trade-off between the hard 
decision decoding of a linear code (based on the weight of the syndrome 
symbols) and the authenticity decision (based on the discrepancy between the 
two message hash digests) to produce accurate and authentic corrected data 
symbols. The algorithm demonstrates the ability to correct up to double byte 
errors and detect up to triple byte errors. The contents are extracted partially 
from Section 5.4. 
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(4) M. Ayoob and W. Adi, “Combining Error Control Coding and Crypto-
Functions to Enhance System Reliability”  
 
Submitted to: International Journal of Network Security. 
This paper includes an extended portion of Chapter 3 of this thesis. The 
paper is also addressing generalizations to use encryption functions for error 
correction. 
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